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“As wars have been won and lost on the battleground of ideas, leverage over the narrative                               
is paramount.” (Franklin 2009, p.222) 
 






Does Internet governance need to be decolonized? If so, why? How can Internet                         
governance be ‘colonial’ (thereby necessitating decolonization) if the colonial project is a                       
thing of the past? And even if Internet governance is a colonial phenomenon, what might                             
it mean to ‘decolonize’ Internet governance, and how should this be carried out? 
In what follows, and drawing on previous work outlining a ‘decolonial computing’ (Ali                         
2014, 2016), I argue that insofar as Internet governance is a (late) modern phenomenon,                           
it is thereby also necessarily colonial, and that decolonizing this phenomenon –                       71
assuming this is possible – is not only desirable but necessary for advancing social                           
justice, both locally and globally. I further hold that the latter project must become focal                             
and that ‘Internet Governance in the Global South’ should be understood in terms of an                             
embrace of the ‘decolonial option’ (Mignolo 2010), viz. preferential disposition towards                     
71  A similar claim regarding the  necessity of computing being considered colonial  insofar as it is a modern                                   
phenomenon was made in an earlier work (Ali 2016). With hindsight, I suggest that this claim should have                                   
been articulated in a more nuanced fashion in order to draw out the  particular (that is, specific,                                 
non­universal, non­totalizing etc.) nature of the claim; in short, not  everything that is modern is  thereby                               
colonial for if the converse were true, it would lead to the rather unfortunate if not bizarre conclusion that                                     
decolonial and critical race theoretical discourses, which are themselves modern phenomena insofar as                         
they are articulated within a modern / postmodern context, would  also be colonial discourses. That said, I                                 
stand by the view that computing, as a  particular phenomenon and one that is socio­technical in                               




those located at the margins or ‘periphery’ of the world system and reparations as                           
compensation for the persistent legacy effects of colonialism. Adopting this normative                     
(political, ethical) orientation points to the possibility of an Internet governance  of ,  by                         
and  for the Global South rather than one framed in terms of the possibilities of                             
‘inclusion’ into an extant, incursive, hegemonically ‘Northern’ (that is, ‘Western’,                   
West-centric etc.) system of Internet governance, albeit one that is, I would suggest,                         
arguably being ‘masked’ (obscured, occluded, hidden), intentionally or otherwise,                 
through advocacy of multi-stakeholder approaches  . 72
Yet in order to begin to think about the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of  decolonizing Internet                             
governance, I hold that it is necessary to first interrogate – that is, ‘question concerning’                             
– the ‘essence’ (that is, the nature, ‘what-ness’ and ‘how-ness’) of the Internet,                         
governance and Internet governance with a view to disclosing their hegemonically                     
colonial nature. In order to do this in such a way as to further the project of local and                                     
global social justice, I suggest the desirability of adopting a broadly phenomenological                       
approach, viz. ‘getting back to things in themselves’, albeit one informed and qualified                         
by critical race theoretical and ‘decolonial’ insights in which body-political (‘who’),                     
geo-political (‘where’) and other concerns related to epistemology and ontology are                     
centred. In short, my concern is to think about what is – or  should be – preparatory for –                                     
that is, prior to – any attempt to think about the decolonization of Internet governance                             
by providing means by which to interrogate the power-relational structures of the                       
Internet, governance and Internet governance relative to issues of ‘knowing’ and ‘being’. 
Why might such ‘preparatory’ inquiry be  necessary ? I would suggest that the simple                         
answer to this question is that there is far too much taken for granted – politically,                               
economically, socially, culturally, ethically etc. – in discussions about Internet                   
72  In terms of related precedents to the argument presented herein, reference should be made to Bhuiyan                                 
(2014) who considers Internet governance  and the Global South, and Zapata Rioja (2014) who considers                             
Internet governance  from a Global South perspective. However, I want to consider what it might mean to                                 
think about Internet governance  in the Global South, and adopting a somewhat Foucauldian perspective, I                             
want to suggest the need to consider the preposition ‘in’ as referring both to Internet governance  over the                                   
Global South by those exercising power from a dominant and currently hegemonic position situated                           
outside it – that is the Global North, ‘the West’ etc. – in contrast to Internet governance done  of ,  by and  for                                           
the Global South itself – that is, by those attempting resistance to the global hegemon. As will be seen in                                       
what follows, my point of departure for such a ‘both­and’ conceptualization of Internet governance ‘in’ the                               
Global South is a ‘decolonial’ extension to world systems theory that requires considering core­periphery                           
(or ‘West’­‘Rest’) relationships in terms of ‘residual legacy system effects’, viz. the persistence of                           




governance; far too many assumptions and predispositions that remain hegemonically                   
and tacitly operative in the background, shaping the boundaries (limits, borders) and                       
contours (landscape, topology) of this discourse, not to mention setting its terms (that is,                           
its ‘logic’ or grammar and ‘lexicon’ or vocabulary), and that a ‘hermeneutical’ or                         73
interpretative inquiry is warranted in order to disclose this background with a view to                           
attempting to forge new decolonial ‘horizons’ including, specifically, those associated                   
with Internet governance. Hence, the need for a  prolegomenon – that is, a preliminary                           
critical discussion serving to introduce and interpret a future extended work –  to the                           
decolonization of Internet governance  , an attempt at providing a theoretical ‘lens’ and                       74
making a methodological and conceptual contribution towards thinking about the issue                     
of Internet governance from a ‘critical’ perspective, that is, one engaging considerations                       
of power. To this end, an attempt is made to disclose what might be described as the                                 
operation of a tacit ‘racialized colonial governmentality’ within Internet governance                   
discourse with a view to preparing the ground for the decolonization of Internet                         
governance  per se  . 75
For this reason, while concurring with the views expressed in the two quotations at the                             
start of this chapter, in what follows I attempt to make the case for adopting a  decolonial                                 
narrative in order to make  decolonial  sense of the world as a preferred orientation                           
relative to other approaches vis-à-vis thinking about Internet governance in/for the                     
Global South. 
 
This chapter has two parts: 
 
In Part I, I begin with a brief presentation of the phenomenological approach informing                           
my argument, drawing attention to important notions such as ‘world’ and ‘horizon’; I                         
then go on to explore in some detail the modern world system, its origin in European                               
colonialism and its fundamentally racialized nature as the ‘background’ or ‘horizon’                     
73  Drawing on the thinking of the later Wittgenstein, Pole (1958) describes grammar as “the form in which                                   
we represent the world; it is like a scheme for a map which for different purposes might be drawn                                     
according to different projections.” (p.36) 
74  In this connection, Odysseos’ (2017) proposal attempting to set out the terms of a prolegomenon in                                 
relation to any future decolonial ethics is timely. 
75  In this preparatory work, there is either no engagement with or only brief exploration of issues which tend                                     
to be the focus of mainstream Internet governance debates. These include ‘critical’ analyses of the control                               




within which Internet governance operates. Following this, I briefly describe what is                       
meant by ‘decoloniality’ and ‘decolonial computing’, contrasting the latter with earlier                     
and related ‘critical’ approaches to ICT including those articulated from the periphery, as                         
well as those ostensibly evincing a preferential orientation towards it.  
In Part II, I begin by outlining my decolonial computing approach to mounting a critique                             
of some contemporary ‘mainstream’ – and North-centric (or West-centric) – Internet                     
governance discourses  . My particular concern is to explicate, through close, decolonial                     76
reading  , the tacit, yet possibly unintentional, operation of colonial logics in certain                       77
views about Internet governance articulated by (DeNardis 2014) and (Mueller 2010, 2017)                     
. In this connection, I draw attention to three issues that I suggest are ‘entangled’ with                               78
the issue of ‘alignment’ which I maintain constitutes a preeminent site for the operation                           
of racialized coloniality in Internet governance discourse: (1) how Internet governance is                       
discursively-framed, by whom and for what purposes; (2) the relation of prior extant                         
network formations – social, political, economic, technological, cultural etc. – to                     
emerging socio-technical networks such as the Internet, web and social media vis-à-vis                       
reproduction of world systemic power-relations; and (3) the persistent yet masked                     
illiberalism of Western conceptions of liberal political and economic order under                     
colonial modernity.  
I then go on to present an extended decolonial reflection on NWICO and WSIS with a                               
view to drawing attention to power-relational shifts in Internet governance discourse                     
that resulted in deferral of the decolonization project, and conclude by offering some                         
brief recommendations about how to proceed with decolonizing Internet governance                   
vis-à-vis the issue of alignment and its ‘entanglement’ with Internet fragmentation. 
 
76  It is important to appreciate that North­/West­centric views can be articulated by those body­politically                             
marked as ‘non­white’ and geo­politically situated in the periphery of the world system – more specifically,                               
located outside ‘the West’; however, I suggest that such articulations should be understood as informed                             
and inflected by coloniality. 
77  My decolonial approach to reading should be understood as broadly methodologically­informed by                         
critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1989) and loosely drawing upon certain ideas associated with                         
discourse theory (Sayyid and Zac 1998). 
78  It must be appreciated that in referring to the ‘tacit’ nature of coloniality ostensibly evinced in the                                   
discourses of theorists such as DeNardis and Mueller, I am not suggesting that such logics are being                                 
deployed  intentionally in the sense of involving conscious and/or wilful intent on their part; rather, that their                                 
discourses are marked by a certain  intentionality (‘aboutness’, ‘directedness’) insofar as they are shaped                           







For present purposes, and drawing upon the sociological and phenomenological account                     
presented by Berger and Luckmann (1966), it might be argued that a ‘world’ is a                             
socially-constructed reality in which people find themselves and which they shape                     
through various kinds of action, both individual and collective. Thus, a ‘world’ is the                           
inter-related totality of things both natural and artifactual, which in the contemporary                       
‘information’ era includes computing and ICT systems, network infrastructure, and                   
various technical institutions and governing bodies responsible for the maintenance and                     
regulation of the former. However, it is important to appreciate that this way of thinking                             
about ‘world’ tends to obscure certain fundamental – or ‘foundational’ – considerations                       
relating to the site and operation of power and its role in bringing forth such a reality –                                   
that is, constituting the being (or ontology) of a world. The philosopher Martin Heidegger                           
(1889-1976) famously stated that the stone is world-less, the animal is poor in world, and                             
the human is ‘world-forming’ (Heidegger 1995). Granted the correctness of this                     
statement, what such an articulation omits to consider – intentionally or otherwise – is                           
the asymmetric wielding of power by different agents (embodied subjects), differently                     
located in time (history) and space (geography), in relation to such world-forming action;                         
in short, Heidegger’s world-forming ‘human’ is a universalizing abstraction that ‘masks’                     
(conceals, occludes) the operation of differential power, and,  a fortiori , the tacit                       
Eurocentrism of ‘the world’ (Maldonado-Torres 2004, 2010), both of which must be taken                         
into consideration when thinking critically about Internet governance insofar as it is a                         
phenomenon in ‘the world’. 
In what follows, I will have recourse to the concept of ‘world’ advanced by philosopher                             
and decolonial theorist, Enrique Dussel, as presented in  Philosophy of Liberation (1985),                       
which he frames as follows: 
World is … an instrumental totality of sense. It is not merely an external                           
aggregate of beings but the totality of the beings that are meaningful to me                           
… The world is thus the system of all systems that have humankind as their                             
foundation … The everyday world, the obvious one that we live in each day,                           
is a totality in time and space. As a temporal totality, it is a retention of the                                 
 
114 
past, a launching site for the fundamental undertakings projected into the                     
future, and the stage on which we live out the present possibilities that                         
depend on that future. As a spatial totality, the world always situates the ‘I,’                           
the person, the subject, as its centre; from this centre beings are organized                         
spatially from the closest ones with the most meaning to the ones furthest                         
away with the least meaning – peripheral beings. (pp. 22-24) 
Dussel’s conception of world, and his framing of it in terms of a spatial-temporal totality                             
– or rather, a geographical-historical ‘matrix’ (Quijano 2007a) – within which are                       
embedded differentially situated subjects, viz. those at ‘the centre’ (or ‘core’) and those at                           
‘the margins’ (or ‘periphery’), is useful insofar as it points to the existence of a                             
historically-sedimented and futurally-oriented background ‘horizon’ against which both               
human beings and various humanly-constructed ‘things’ (objects, processes, events etc.)                   
and ‘artefactual’ systems must be positioned in order to make sense of them. The                           
importance of this finding for the present study is that the Internet (as sociotechnical),                           
governance (as political) and Internet governance (as ostensibly institutional ) are all                     79
artefactual systems (and processes) and hence, must all be positioned in relation to ‘the                           
world’. Yet, phenomenologically-speaking, the existence of the world as a ‘horizon’ for                       
‘historically-shaped’ and ‘futurally-oriented’ projects necessitates that, beyond             
interrogating the nature of  particular systemic artefacts such as the above, there is a                           
prior need to subject the broader totality that is ‘the world’ itself to interrogation with a                               
view to understanding  its embedding, systemic nature and, from a critical race                       
theoretical and decolonial perspective, this means interrogating the origins of the                     
modern world system and the nature of its political ontology.  
 
3. The Modern/Colonial World System 
A review of the vast and expanding literature on Internet governance readily evinces                         
that ‘mainstream’ discourse, including that which claims to engage with ‘critical’ or                       
power-relational concerns, tends to focus on ostensibly technical issues of end-to-end                     
connectivity, openness, standards and interoperability, and social concerns about an                   
ongoing commitment to ‘network neutrality’, the trade-off between privacy and                   




security, and the continued ‘stability’ and ‘universality’ of the Internet in the face of the                             
alleged ‘threat’ of fragmentation, whether posed by democratic or ‘authoritarian’                   
governments  . Crucially, in relation to what was stated in the previous section, this                         80
discourse tends to operate against an assumed liberal, if not neoliberal, background                       
‘horizon’ wherein matters relating to political-economy and culture in computing and                     
ICT contexts are framed in terms of notions metonymically associated with modern                       
capitalism such as free markets  , unrestricted flow of goods and services, democratic                       81
governance, progress, development etc.  82
However, adopting a  decolonial perspective requires us to reconsider the nature of                       
neoliberal capitalism by situating it in relation to the long durée of the modern world                             
system and its origins in European colonialism. Decolonial thinking traces its origins to                         
Marxist world systems theory, dependency theory and area studies, yet goes beyond                       
these frameworks by considering the nature of the world system from the experience of                           
those located at the non-European margins (or periphery) of this system rather than                         
those situated at its European core; furthermore, and crucially, decolonial thought                     
necessitates thinking about the nature or constitution of the world system in terms of                           
the construction of core-periphery relations  foundationally predicated on processes of                   
‘racialization’ and the production of an asymmetric             83
‘West-Rest’/Europe-non-Europe/North-South binary, thereby calling into question           
80  Other obvious threats include cybercrime and cyberwar, neither of which are considered here. Regarding                             
the term ‘authoritarianism’, it must be noted that its deployment is necessarily informed by commitment,                             
tacit or explicit, to a particular sociopolitical formation as normative, articulated from a particular site of                               
enunciation; in short, there is nothing ‘neutral’ (or objective) about the term ‘authoritarian’ – it is                               
‘politically­loaded’ through and through. For a useful critique of how this term is deployed for                             
Eurocentric/West­centric purposes, see Sayyid (2005). 
81  For ‘Leftist’ critiques of the ideology – and rhetoric – of ‘free market’ capitalism under neoliberalism, see                                   
Amin (2004) and Tandon (2015) among other works. 
82  Crucially, I suggest that this is the case both for those apparently committed to the hegemonic capitalist                                   
project such as Mueller (2010, 2017) and DeNardis (2015, 2016), as well as those explicitly committed to                                 
‘subaltern’ anti­capitalist / anti­imperialist positions such as Abu Bhuiyan (2008, 2014) insofar as both                           
groups frame their positions in relation to the modern world system  as capitalist. 
83  According to Miles (2004), ‘racialization’ refers to “any process or situation wherein the meaning of ‘race’                                 
is introduced to define and given meaning to some particular population, its characteristics and actions.”                             
(p.348) Extending this view, Hesse (2007) maintains that rather than being necessarily correlated with the                             
presence (or absence) of material markers on the body, “racialization [is] embodied in a series of                               
onto­colonial taxonomies of land, climate, history, bodies, customs, language, all of which became                         




‘economistic’ characterizations of the world system as capitalist  . In this sense, and at a                           84
minimum, it is necessary to talk about the modern capitalist world system as  also a                             
colonial racist world system (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992a), and decolonial                   
interrogation of the contemporary world system should be seen as exposing the ‘dark                         
underside’ (Mignolo 2011) of Western modernity as a racist colonial order  . While this                         85
‘West-Rest’ binary can, and should, be unpacked along body-political and geo-political                     
lines – that is, in terms of how different bodies are ‘raced’ differently in different ‘zones’                               
of the world system – the formative ‘entanglement’ of race with ‘religion’,                       
notwithstanding the contested nature of the latter as a universal category, should not be                           
ignored: as Pasha (2017a) has rightly argued, there is a tendency of postcolonial and                           
decolonial theorists to operate within a ‘secular’ (that is, post-religious) framework                     86
which obscures consideration of persistent ‘theo-political’ forces at play in the                     
modern/colonial world system  , a failing to which he draws attention in the context of                           87
discussing how to move beyond the Eurocentrism of mainstream and ‘critical’                     
84  Such ‘foundationalism’ should not be understood as implying a commitment to a position                           
structurally­analogous to that assumed in Marxist infrastructure­superstructure analysis wherein economic                   
phenomena are held to determine political, cultural etc. phenomena. While race / racism / racialization                             
might function as a ‘primary contradiction’ (Mills 2003), and concurring with Quijano (2007b) that “the idea                               
of ‘race’ is surely the most efficient instrument of social domination produced in the last 500 years” having                                   
been “imposed as the basic criterion for social classification of the entire world’s population [and] taken as                                 
the principal determinant of the world’s new social and geocultural identities” (p.45), it is by no means the                                   
only such ‘marker’ of difference, nor are all other markers / contradictions to be reduced to it. According to                                     
Quijano (2007b), “’racism’ in daily social relations is not, to be sure, the  only manifestation of the coloniality                                   
of power, but it is certainly the  most obvious and the most  omnipresent . For this reason, it has remained                                     
the  principal arena of conflict [emphases added].” (p.46) Expanding on this view, Grosfoguel (2011) argues                             
that race should be understood to function as an  organizing principle , ‘transversally’ structuring a number                             
of ‘entangled’ hierarchies including, but not limited to, the epistemic, spatial, sexual, economic, ecological,                           
political, spiritual and aesthetic. For present purposes, it should be noted that included among such                             
hierarchies is “a media/informational hierarchy where the West has the control over the means of global                               
media production and information technology while the non­West do not have the means to make their                               
points of view enter the global media networks.” (p.10) 
85  In this connection, Bhambra (2014) maintains that, for Quijano, “the modernity that Europe takes as the                                 
context for its own being is, in fact, so deeply imbricated in the structures of European colonial domination                                   
over the rest of the world that it is impossible to separate the two: hence, modernity / coloniality.” (p.118) 
86  As an aside, I suggest that critical race philosopher Charles W. Mills espouses such a ‘secular’                                 
commitment when referring to the triad of race, class and gender to the exclusion of ‘religion’ in his various                                     
works. 
87  In this connection, I have elsewhere drawn attention to the sedimented, historically­constitutive                         
antagonistic negative dialectical relation between Christendom  cum Europe  cum ‘the West’ and the                         




approaches to international relations, the latter being of obvious relevance to the                       
discourse of Internet governance . 88
On this basis, and following the lead of seminal decolonial thinker, Frantz Fanon (1986), I                             
want to argue that when thinking about, speaking of, and acting in the ‘modern world’,                             
we need to understand the latter as ‘The World’ – that is,  the global hierarchical system of                                 
domination, whose dominant core lies in ‘the West’ and whose subaltern periphery is                         
constituted by ‘the Rest’ (Hall 1992), which emerged as a historically-unprecedented                     
phenomenon during what has come to be known as the long  durée of the 16 th century                               
commencing with the Columbia voyages in 1492 CE  . In addition to ‘the West’ and ‘the                             89
Rest’– and the ‘West’ can include ‘Eastern’ constituents such as Japan (a case of the                             
exception  confirming the rule) – ‘The World’ goes by many other names articulated with                           
increasing intensity, clarity and visibility in the contemporary era: coloniality of power                       
(Quijano 1992b), racist culture (Goldberg 1993), global white supremacy (Mills 1997), the                       
modern racial world system (Winant 2004), the Orientalist world system (Samman 2008)                       
and the colonial matrix of power or modernity/coloniality (Mignolo 2011) among others.                       
What is common to all such ‘namings’, if only in terms of a Wittgensteinian shared                             




88  In this connection, the present work should be seen as aimed at contributing to what Mills (2015a) refers                                     
to as the ‘unwriting and unwhitening of the world’ which he explores in the context of ‘critical’ international                                   
relations theory and which I engage in relation to internet governance. 
89  According to Wallerstein (2006), “the history of the modern world­system has been in large part a history                                   
of the expansion of European states and peoples into the rest of the world” (p.1), commencing with the                                   
so­called Columbian “voyages of discovery” in 1492 CE which resulted in the emergence of a                             
racial­capitalist world system. This global modern/colonial order was predicated on a set of unequal                           
relationships between the colonial power and the colony, and between the colonists – or colonizers – and                                 
the indigenous population – or colonized. Such relationships assumed the form of an ensemble of                             
socio­cultural norms, attitudes, and practices in which race as naturalized, heritable (or reproductive),                         
hierarchical (or taxonomic) exclusion, rather than capital, functioned as organizing principle. 
90  The literature on race / racism is vast and somewhat eclectic, and engagement with it is clearly beyond                                     
the scope and remit of this study. For present purposes, it should suffice to invoke the                               
postcolonial/decolonial conception of race / racism articulated by Hesse (2004, 2007), viz. that                         
phenomenon tied to processes of ‘racialization’ which give rise to a series of Eurocentric material                             
‘assemblages’ (systems of classification, taxonomies etc.) emerging in the context of European colonial                         
expansion during the long durée of the 16 th century. In passing, it should be noted that while an emerging                                     
body of scholarship offers the prospect of revising the onset and periodization of race/racism, I would                               





Although formal ‘boots on the ground’ colonialism ended in the 1960s as a consequence                           
of various national decolonization struggles, the decolonization project remains                 
unfinished insofar as the contemporary ‘postcolonial’ situation is marked by a condition                       
of ‘coloniality’ that involves: (1) an ongoing legacy of colonialism in contemporary                       
societies in the form of social discrimination, which has outlived formal colonialism and                         
become integrated in succeeding postcolonial social orders, both core and periphery; and                       
(2) practices and legacies of European colonialism in terms of the persistence of certain                           
‘sedimented’ colonial ways of knowing and being – that is, colonial epistemology and                         
ontology – based on systems of categorization, classification, and taxonomisation, and                     
their manifestation in histories, knowledge structures, artefacts, and technologies                 
including, I want to suggest, those of relatively recent origin such as the Internet. In this                               
connection, and by way of preparing the ground for the presentation of certain                         
arguments in Part II, it is imperative to note that an expanding body of scholarship                             
produced by critical race philosophers and decolonial theorists has made – and  continues                         
to make – an arguably convincing case that  actual social, political and economic                         
liberalism was forged upon racist and ostensibly ‘illiberal’ foundations including                   
colonialism, indigenous genocide and slavery (Mills 2017). 
Building on such arguments, I want to suggest that Internet governance and its                         
associated discourse, irrespective of whether the latter is ‘mainstream’ / liberal, ‘critical’,                       
postcolonial or even decolonial (as is the one presented herein), tacitly operates against a                           
background ‘horizon’ of coloniality. If this is true, then the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of the                             
Internet, governance and Internet governance, and the latter’s tendency to discursively                     
frame and concern itself with issues of network neutrality, openness, standards and                       
interoperability, stability and universality (as against instability and fragmentation),                 
must be understood as  potentially informed and inflected by the differential                     91
body-political and geo-political – and possibly also theo-political (given the                   
‘entanglement’ of race and religion mentioned earlier) – orientations of those generating                       
this discourse; in short, there is a need to consider ‘race’ and ‘place’ in the modern world                                 
91  This qualifier is necessary so that I am not understood to be positing the  actual orientation of any                                     




system vis-à-vis the historically-informed dispositions and biases orienting the                 
futurally-directed projects of power-relationally differentiated discursive stakeholders  . 92
 
3.2. A Brief Note on ‘Westphalian State-Centrism’ 
While an understanding of the background ‘horizon’ that is the modern/colonial world                       
system with its attendant structuring logic of racialized coloniality is key to the                         
decolonial argument presented herein, there is another, related issue that needs to be                         
briefly discussed insofar as it speaks directly to how the matter of ‘alignment’ is framed                             
in Internet governance discourse, viz.  the global nation-state system . 
Mainstream Internet governance discourse almost invariably tends to be articulated                   
against the backdrop of, and centre upon, the Westphalian international state system  .                       93
Appreciation of this fact is crucial since ‘Westphalian state-centrism’ tends to obscure                       
the relational background, both geographical and historical, against which the                   
Westphalian interstate system itself emerged. In this connection, I maintain that,                     
notwithstanding the fictive Eurocentrism of a ‘Westphalian narrative’ that purports to                     
trace the origins of the contemporary inter-state system to the Treaty of Westphalia in                           
1648 CE (Kayaoglu 2010)  , it is imperative to think about the Westphalian interstate                         94
system in relation to the long durée history of the modern/colonial world system                         
emerging in 1492 CE. In short, the ‘Westphalian setting’ should be understood as                         
embedded within an encompassing ‘colonial setting’, and that the latter informs and                       
92  Pre­empting criticism of this line of argument on the grounds that it evinces a commitment on my part to                                       
some form of crude ‘identity politics’, I should like to suggest that such a move is decolonially­suspect in                                   
that it tacitly attempts to re­centre a Eurocentric conception of politics, irrespective of whether liberal /                               
individualist or Marxist / class­based in orientation, that is fundamentally economistic. Beyond this, and                           
drawing on arguments presented by Sayyid and Zac (1998), I should like to suggest that  all politics is                                   
identity politics in that political subjectivity and agency is necessarily tied up with questions of identity and                                 
difference; further, that it is not possible to understand political identity outside of discursive articulation. In                               
short, (political) identities are  products of discourse. 
93  I aver that Westphalian state­centrism sets the terms of debate irrespective of whether one is arguing for                                   
the central role of the state in matters of Internet governance (Goldsmith and Wu 2008) (Salhi 2009), or                                   
contesting such centrality (DeNardis 2014) (Mueller 2010, 2017) etc. along multistakeholder lines. 
94  In this connection, it is interesting to note that Mueller (2017), an opponent of Westphalian state­centrism                                 
vis­à­vis Internet governance, maintains that “it is common to assert that the nation­state system has been                               
in place for centuries. While that is true of a few major European powers such as France and the UK,                                       
which took their familiar form since the seventeenth century, most of Europe's political units took the form                                 
of multinational empires and most of the non­western developing world was subject to colonial powers. Not                               




inflects the political structures associated with the former . Granted the validity of this                         95
claim, it would appear to suggest that transitioning to a  post-Westphalian state-centric                       
political reality would not necessarily entail transitioning to a  post-West -centric reality                     
since coloniality stands in a contingent relation to Westphalian state-centrism and can                       
persist beyond the nation-state system. For example, and as will be argued in more detail                             
later, ‘network colonialism’ – that is, the operation of colonial logics in global /                           
transnational networks such as the Internet, web and social media – is not only possible                             
but, I suggest,  probable given (1) the historical ‘entanglement’ of prior extant ‘legacy                         
system’ networks with such ‘emergent’ socio-technical network formations, and (2) the                     
operation of network effects including ‘preferential attachment’. 
 
4. Decoloniality and Decolonial Computing 
Having described the colonial nature of ‘the world’ within which the Internet,                       
governance and Internet governance are embedded as socio-technical, political and                   
institutional phenomena, it is necessary to briefly clarify the idea of ‘decoloniality’,                       
explain what is meant by ‘decolonial computing’ and suggest why the latter approach is                           
preferable to other related earlier ‘critical’ orientations vis-à-vis Internet governance                   
in/for the Global South. 
 
4.1. Decoloniality 
In addition to (1) dating the onset of the condition of modernity and/or the modern                             
world system to European colonialism and the long durée of the 16 th century, (2)                           
understanding this system as global and  racialized – thereby entailing the need to engage                           
critique of capitalism in terms of  racial political economy – and (3) insisting on the                             
persistence of structural colonial logics or ‘coloniality’ into the contemporary                   
postcolonial era, decolonial thought and praxis – that is,  decoloniality – is also                         
characterized by adoption of what decolonial theorists Walter Mignolo and Madina                     
Tlostanova (2006, 2009) refer to as ‘delinking’ and border-thinking, viz. consideration of                       
the ‘body-politics’ and ‘geo-politics’ of knowledge – that is,  who is thinking / knowing                           
and from  where – engaging thereby with the  material  dimensions of epistemology in                         
contrast to the abstract / disembodied ‘theo-politics’ and, following secularization,                   




‘ego-politics’ of universalizing Eurocentric epistemology by thinking from the margins                   
(borders, frontiers, periphery). Crucially, such ‘materiality’ is not that of the race-less /                         
de-raced structures of political economy or culture, but that of the corporeal experiences                         
of those who have been excluded from the production of knowledge by colonial                         
modernity. In addition, according to Mignolo (2010a), decoloniality “is not an                     
interdisciplinary  tool but, rather, a trans-disciplinary  horizon in which de-coloniality of                     
knowledge and de-colonial knowledge places life (in general) first and institutions at the                         
service of the regeneration of life [emphasis added].” (p.11) On his view, decoloniality                         
necessitates integrating the concepts of coloniality, modernity, and decolonisation of                   
knowledge by thinking about history (time) in relation to geography (space), thereby                       
providing the basis for subjecting the idea of a single linear time and associated notions                             
of ‘progress’ and ‘development’ – both of which appear in Internet governance discourse                       
– to critique in terms of the operation of power, and motivating the shift away from a                                   96
universal perspective towards a ‘pluriversal’ perspective – that is, a worldview                     
constituted from multiple sites of enunciation, pre-eminently those situated at the                     
margins of the world system  . 97
 
96  Consider in this regard the following statement contained in the NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement                           
(NETmundial 2014) related to ‘Human Rights and Shared Values’: “all people have a right to development                               
and the Internet has a vital role to play in helping to achieve the full realization of internationally agreed                                     
sustainable development goals. It is a vital tool for giving people living in poverty the means to participate                                   
in development processes.”; and the following in relation to ‘Access and low barriers’: “Internet governance                             
should promote universal, equal opportunity, affordable and high quality Internet access so it can be an                               
effective tool for enabling human development and social inclusion.” Other statements in this document                           
reinforcing the commitment to development include the following: “Internet governance should promote                       
sustainable and inclusive development and for the promotion of human rights”; and “all stakeholders                           
should renew their commitment to build a people centred, inclusive and development oriented Information                           
Society as defined by the WSIS outcome documents. Therefore in pursuing the improvements of the                             
Internet governance ecosystem, the focus on development should be retained.” For detailed critiques of                           
‘development’, ‘progress’ and related notions as Eurocentric, see Sachs (2010). For a critique of                           
‘developmentalism’ or “the fetishization of development”, see Dirlik (2014), and critique of ‘development as                           
colonialism’, see Goldsmith (1997) and Rist (2008). 
97  According to Bhambra (2014), “Mignolo develops Quijano’s earlier theoretical work and, in particular,                           
further elaborates his conception of modernity/coloniality in the context of the work of epistemic                           
decolonization necessary to undo the damage wrought by both modernity and by understanding                         
modernity/coloniality only as modernity. The decolonization of knowledge, he suggests, occurs in                       
acknowledging the sources and geo­political locations of knowledge while at the same time affirming those                             
modes and practices of knowledge that have been denied by the dominance of particular forms. He is not                                   
arguing simply for a geo­politics of location as central to any academic endeavour, but rather a                               
consideration of what that geo­politics enables to be known and how it is to be known. The key issue for                                       





Computing is inherently colonial in some sense since as a modern phenomenon, it is                           
founded upon, and continues to embody aspects of, colonialism. I suggest that this holds                           
for specific kinds of computing such as ubicomp, which has been said to be driven by a                                 
‘colonial impulse’ (Dourish and Mainwaring 2012), as well as other areas of computing                         
such as HCI, AI, robotics, ICT4D, ‘Big Data’ / data science and Internet governance. In                             
fact, and as argued elsewhere, computing  per se should be understood as characterized                         
by an ‘expansionist’ thrust associated with the transformation of the modern world                       
through incessant ‘computerization’ (latterly ‘digitalization’ and more recently,               
‘datafication’) and the rise of a purportedly global ‘information society’ following the                       
‘cybernetic turn’ of the 1950s (Ali 2016). Crucially, this expansionist thrust is                       
hegemonically-Western, computing emerging in the West (primarily Britain and the US)                     
against the background of inter-European conflicts (WW2) and post-war ideological                   
conflicts (The Cold War), both of which need to be considered in relation to the periphery                               
as non-European world (WW2) or Third World (The Cold War), respectively  . In the                         98
context of the present study, particular attention needs to be afforded to the                         
‘supremacist’ motivations underpinning the race to develop a global information                   
network or Internet, and in this connection Barbrook (2007) provides an account which I                           
suggest merits engaging with at some length insofar as it provides a number of                           
important insights that other more mainstream, liberal and somewhat ‘technophilic’                   
accounts have tended to ignore  . 99
98  In this connection, consider the military setting against which two ‘founding fathers’ of modern                             
computing, Alan Turing and John von Neumann, developed their ideas: Turing, a mathematician,                         
cryptographer and computer scientist was involved in the war effort as a code breaker at Bletchley Park                                 
during WW2; von Neumann, a mathematician and computer scientist, played a decisive role in the US                               
Cold War effort. 
99  In this connection, consider, for example, the authoritative account of Naughton (1999) for whom “it’s                               
always earlier than you think. Whenever you go looking for the origins of any significant technological                               
development you find that the more you learn about it, the deeper its roots seem to tunnel into the past.”                                       
(p.49) In this connection he is led to ask: “how far down should we drill in seeking the origins of the Net?                                           
Given that a large part of my story is about computers, should I go back all the way to the 1830s when                                           
Charles Babbage developed detailed plans for what he called the ‘analytical engine’, a device capable of                               
performing any arithmetical operation in response to instructions contained on punched cards?” (p.50) On                           
his view, “any starting­point for an historical trail is likely to be arbitrary.” (p.51) From a critical race                                   
theoretical and decolonial perspective, I would suggest that this is not the case; rather, than the choice of                                   
starting point is determined by ethico­political orientation. It should be noted, however, that Naughton is                             
well­aware of the centrality of The Cold War vis­à­vis emergence of the Internet: “the Internet did not                                 
originate in one blinding, ‘Eureka!’ moment. But if one had to put a finger on the spark that lit the fuse, one                                           




According to Barbrook (2007), “the imaginary future of artificial intelligence disguised                     
the original motivation for developing IBM’s mainframes: killing large numbers of                     
people. During the Cold War, smart advertising had to hide horrific use values ... The                             
horrors of the Cold War present had been successfully hidden by the marvels of the                             
imaginary futures.” (pp.50-51) While framing the development of such ‘AI-for-death’                   
technology in terms of the targeting of Russian cities, I want to suggest that this target of                                 
the Western ‘war-machine’, although quite real, was relatively recent in origin when                       
considered relative to non-Europe, the target of Western colonial violence for the past                         
five centuries  . Barbrook goes on to state that “because of the nuclear stalemate in                           100
Europe, the most important front in the Cold War was the propaganda battle ... The                             
long-term security of America’s sphere of influence now required more than the ‘hard                         
power’ of military and economic pre-eminence. The US elite also had to achieve                         
supremacy in the ‘soft power’ of ideological and cultural hegemony [emphasis added].”                       
(p.84) Regarding the Cold War origins of the Internet, he maintains that “when, in the                             
early 1960s, the CIA alerted the US government to the danger of falling behind its rival in                                 
the race to build the Net, ARPA was given the responsibility for fighting this new battle                               
on the technological front of the Cold War.” (p.151) According to Barbrook, the CIA                           
argued that “the technological race to develop the Net had become the key contest which                             
would decide whether America or Russia would lead humanity into the information                       
society. The superpower that owned this imaginary future had  hegemony over the entire                         
bleeping football called Sputnik.” (p.77) While the origins of the Internet in the efforts of various engineers                                 
receiving ARPA funding is widely recognised, he maintains that under J.C.R. Licklider’s brief leadership of                             
ARPA’s Command and Control Division, its vision transitioned from a military outlook to a “ utopianism                             
which maintained that computer technology held out the promise of a better world [emphasis added]”                             
(p.82) Against this technophile perspective, and following Barbrook (2007), yet reframing the latter’s                         
Eurocentric / West­centric Marxist narrative in the context of considering global core­periphery                       
modern/colonial power relations, I want to suggest that Western ‘utopianism’ should be understood as a                             
‘neo­colonial’ attempt to project some form of  Eurocentric universal (Wallerstein 2006) –                       
rhetorically­camouflaged as progress, development etc. – onto the world. 
100  In this connection, Blaney and Ticker (2017) raise a number of pertinent questions: “How can we think of                                     
the Cold War as a long­peace, given the vast body­count across the globe? How is a liberal peace                                   
consistent with liberal colonial wars? Why do the field’s foundational stories revert to World War I and not                                   
the administration of race relations and external (and internal) colonies?” (p.301) In addition, there is the                               
matter of the ‘Orientalization’ of the Soviet Union by the US and its allies during The Cold War, arguably                                     




planet [emphasis added]” (p.164); and on the matter of the emergence of the                         
‘information society’, he maintains that: 
 
Across the ideological spectrum, possessing the prophecy of the Net had                     
become a claim to political power. When the owner of the future controlled                         
the present, geopolitical rivalries and class conflicts were focused upon the                     
struggle between opposing definitions of the global village. At various                   
times from the 1950s to the 2000s, the information society has been                       
identified as a state plan, a military machine, a mixed economy, a                       
university campus, a hippy commune , a free market, a medieval                   101
community or a dotcom firm. During these five decades, these rival                     
definitions came in and out of fashion as the fortunes of their promoters                         
waxed and waned. Only one principle remained constant throughout. If                   
about nothing else, the rival ideologues agreed that building the Net was                       
making the future society. (p.273) 
While broadly concurring with Barbrook’s reading of the Internet and the information                       
society as ‘entangled’ with competition over ‘planetary informational hegemony’, from a                     
critical race theoretical and decolonial perspective, I would suggest that his Marxist                       
‘core-centric’ interpretation of such Cold War developments results in a framing of the                         
issue in classist and economistic terms, viz. the Internet as a vehicle for neoliberal                           
capitalism and US imperialism  . On a decolonial framing, it might be argued that the                           102
race for the net was tied up with the need for ‘the West’ (under US leadership) to                                 
maintain, expand and refine global white (cum Western  ) supremacy under                   103
contestation both at home and abroad,  ostensibly from the Soviet Union (‘The East’) but                           
certainly from the decolonizing Third World (‘the Rest’)  . 104
101  For a ‘subaltern’ structuralist critique of ‘countercultural’ readings of the Internet and ‘information                           
society’, see (Aouragh and Chakravartty 2016). 
102  There is also the matter of the  European origin and arguably  Eurocentric logic of Marxism to consider;                                   
on this point, see Mills (1997, 2003) among other works. 
103  On the discursive shift from ‘white’ to ‘Western’, see (Füredi 1998) and Bonnett (2003, 2005). 
104  On the ‘entanglement’ of Cold War politics with what African­American sociologist W.E.B. DuBois                           
described as “the problem of the 20 th century” (1903), viz. “the problem of the colour line” or racism, see                                     
(Füredi 1998), (Borstlemann 2001) and (Westad 2017). Notwithstanding gains accruing from civil rights                         
struggles in the particular local context of the US, and those associated with anti­colonial movements more                               
globally which resulted in the formal independence of previously colonised peoples, the ‘decolonial project’                           
remains unfinished and, importantly, continues to be deferred if not thwarted by hegemonic players in the                               
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In terms of the relevance of The Cold War to matters of Internet governance, it is                               
intriguing to note that in an essay entitled ‘Are we in a Digital Cold War?’ aimed at                                 
mounting a historically-informed critique of the idea of contemporary ‘Cyber Cold War’                       
emerging in the aftermath of the Dubai World Conference on International                     
Telecommunications (WCIT), Mueller (2013) maintains that “the very act of framing the                       
problem in that way ... contribute[s] to the militarization of the Internet and                         
foreshadow[s] a bleak future: an Internet policy landscape dominated by national                     
security concerns and great power conflict.” On his view, “the best response to the                           
challenge [of a posited Cyber Cold War] would be a historically informed review of the                             
nature of the Cold War, coupled with a dispassionate analysis of its similarities and                           
differences to the current cyber situation.” Crucially, Mueller explicitly holds that such a                         
“larger perspective on the Cold War is important to students of Internet governance.” Yet                           
what is the  scope of this ‘larger perspective’? Mueller goes on to present a core-centric /                               
West-centric and Westphalian nation state-centric reading of The Cold War as the final                         
struggle in a long war “over the nature and constitution of the 20 th century nation state”.                               
Nowhere does the ‘entanglement’ of the Cold War and the colour line, both local /                             
national and global / transnational, feature in this account; rather, there is an overriding                           
state-centric concern with ‘militarization’ of the Internet, ignoring the possibility that,                     
from a critical race theoretical and decolonial perspective, the Internet was already                       
militarized  as a multistakeholder informational space geared towards maintaining – and                     
expanding – Western  supremacy through political, economic, cultural and other means.                     
In short, I want to suggest that Mueller’s ‘larger narrative’ of ‘the long war’ (over                             
nation-statism) ultimately constitutes an ‘intra-core account’ that serves to occlude the                     
long durée  historical war against the peripheral(ized) ‘other’. 
 
4.2.2. Decolonizing Computing  
Decolonial computing (Ali 2014, 2016) is a recent proposal that attempts to engage with                           
the phenomenon of computing from a perspective informed by (even if not situated at)                           
the margins or periphery of the modern world system wherein issues of ‘body politics’                           
and ‘geo-politics’ of knowledge are analytically foregrounded. Decolonial computing, as                   
world system such that the problem of the 20 th century continues as the problem of the 21 st century, albeit                                     




a critical project, is about interrogating who is doing computing, from where are they                           
doing it, and how (that is, in terms of which knowledge paradigms); on this basis, issues                               
of race, and not merely ‘culture’ and ‘power’, are brought into bold relief, prompting the                             
need for critical thinking about what freedom, inclusion, diversity and equality might                       
mean from a world systems perspective informed by a preferential option for the                         
peripheralized – that is, an ethical commitment to effecting compensation and/or                     
reparations for the persistent ‘legacy effects’ of colonialism. Researchers and                   
practitioners adopting a decolonial computing perspective are required, at a minimum,                     
to do the following: firstly, consider their geo-political and body-political orientation                     
when designing, building, researching, or theorizing about computing phenomena;                 
secondly, embrace the ‘decolonial option’ as an ethic, attempting to think through what                         
it might mean to design and build and  govern computing and ICT systems with and  for                               
those situated at the peripheries of the world system, informed by the ways of thinking                             
and knowing (epistemologies) located at such sites, with a view to undermining the                         
asymmetry of local-global power relationships. 
 
4.3. Related Precedents and Their Limitations 
In closing this part, I turn to examine some related ‘critical’ approaches to engaging with                             
ICT phenomena – more specifically, Internet governance – drawing attention to their                       
perceived limitations from a decolonial perspective with a view to making the case for                           
the adoption of a decolonial computing approach to Internet governance. 
 
4.3.1. Postcolonial Computing/ICT 
The potential utility of certain ideas drawn from postcolonial studies for disclosing the                         
persistence of colonial epistemologies in computing has not been lost on theorists and                         
practitioners. In this connection, ‘post-colonial computing’ (Irani et al. 2010) (Dourish                     
and Mainwaring 2012) (Philip et al. 2012) has been proposed as an analytic lens and guide                               
to praxis in which questions of power, authority, legitimacy, participation, and                     
intelligibility in contexts of cultural encounter against the backdrop of contemporary                     
globalization are centred. Notwithstanding the contribution that such a stance might                     
make vis-à-vis interrogating Internet governance discourse, I suggest that it suffers                     
from three drawbacks relative to a decolonial computing approach: (1) a tendency to                         
focus on  local manifestations of power, conceptualizing these in post-structuralist terms                     
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which go back to Foucault, rather than engaging with  global structuralist framings in                         
terms of asymmetric power relations  ; (2) a tendency towards privileging ‘culturalist’                     105
perspectives over and against maintaining a sharp focus on concerns of (racial) political                         
economy; and (3) a tendency to engage with the legacy effects of colonialism from the                             
18 th century onwards rather than date the onset of colonialism to 1492 CE and the long                               
durée of the 16 th  century. 
A somewhat different ‘postcolonial’ approach to ICT, drawing on the work of Marxist                         
economist Samir Amin and others, has been proposed by Abu Bhuiyan (2008, 2014) who                           
argues for engaging Internet governance issues from a critical Global South perspective                       
along ‘postcolonial’ and ‘Third-Worldist’ lines  . While useful in terms of providing for a                         106
critique of the imperialist and neo-colonial drivers underpinning capitalism in its                     
neoliberal form, I would suggest that this approach has limited  decolonial value on                         
105  According to Franklin (2004), “no technology stands above and beyond those who design and control it.                                 
In that respect, ‘we’ get the Internet ‘we’ deserve. Critical social constructivist, feminist, and postcolonial                             
approaches to ICTs in general, and the Internet/World Wide Web in particular, would focus on the                               
class/status, race/ethnicity, and sex/gender exactitudes and nuances of online–offline (re)articulations of                     
structural power. They would aim to examine inner and outer tensions of these everyday tactical and                               
strategic operations, and demystify assumptions about sex/gender, race/ethnicity, and class/status in the                       
process. They would all want to underscore how the tale of non­elite and ‘non­Western’ practices of                               
everyday life online is just as cogent, just as vibrant, and just as crucial to debates about the present and                                       
future of ICTs in any ‘new world order.’” (p.228) While conceding that such critical approaches to ICT                                 
phenomena in general, and Internet governance more specifically, can be used to disclose the relevance                             
of non­Western practices and formation, I would suggest that Franklin possibly overstates the case for                             
‘resistance’ by virtue of a post­structuralist appeal to Foucauldian analyses of power as diffuse and                             
locally­operative, obscuring more structuralist accounts which continue to emphasize the hegemonic, if not                         
supremacist, nature of ‘core’ power relations within the world system; for a useful critique of such                               
post­structuralist approaches drawing on Frantz Fanon’s decolonial thought, see (Ciccariello­Maher 2006).                     
I would suggest that, ironically, Franklin (2011) herself concedes the facticity of ‘Western’ technological                           
hegemony (vis­à­vis non­Western subaltern resistant technological formations) in stating that although                     
“initial designs and intentions can change as technologies are used, subverted or redesigned according to                             
different principles”, nonetheless “as generational layers of programs they can also become difficult to                           
redirect. Integrated systems and their increasing levels of complexity and long­term investment                       
commitments thereby start to take on a quasi­autonomous quality [emphasis added].” (pp.13­14) Beyond                         
this, there is a need to consider the problematic nature of invocations of the ‘intersectional mantra’, viz.                                 
“class, race and gender”, which Johar Schueller (2005) argues is a hallmark of white feminist thinking, and                                 
which obscures asymmetric, non­homologous differences between various structural power relations. 
106  For example, Abu Bhuiyan (2008) maintains that “when the information society project is seen from a                                 
postcolonial subject position, it seems like a neocolonial project with a goal to expand information                             
capitalism across the South.” On his view, ‘postcolonial’ refers to “an epistemological position that is in                               
opposition to colonialism”, a position he develops “by combining the elements of postcolonial theory and                             
critical political economy.” (p.100) This stance appears closer to a decolonial orientation than the                           
postcolonial orientation associated with ‘postcolonial computing’ insofar as it advances an oppositional                       
rather than merely pluralizing / decentering orientation; however, Abu Bhuiyan’s commitment to interpreting                         




account of its Marxist orientation wherein economic issues remain determinative                   
relative to others, while the issue of race and its ‘entanglement’ with political economy                           
in the modern/colonial world system, viz.  racial political economy , remains somewhat                     
obscured. In appealing to anti-imperialist currents and precedents within world systems                     
theory and dependency theory in order to frame the world system in neo-liberal /                           
capitalist terms, I aver that Abu Bhuiyan’s approach suffers from a theoretical                       
shortcoming in that it does not take into consideration Quijano’s extension of world                         
systems theory incorporating the foundational and constitutive role of racial colonialism                     
in the formation of the modern world system (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992a)  . On this                           107
basis, I would suggest that any attempt at thinking about Internet governance in (of, by,                             
for) the Global South along anti-imperialist lines is problematic since it misconstrues the                         
nature of ‘the world’ (system) and the place / position of Internet governance, as a                             
sub-systemic phenomenon, within it vis-à-vis the centrality of the systemic, structuring                     
logics of race / racism / racialization  . In addition, his position evinces a rather                           108
107  According to Grosfoguel (2011), “the old Marxist paradigm of infrastructure and superstructure [needs to                             
be] replaced by a historical­heterogeneous structure … or a ‘heterarchy’… that is, an entangled articulation                             
of multiple hierarchies, in which subjectivity and the social imaginary is not derivative but constitutive of the                                 
structures of the world­system … In this conceptualization,  race and racism are not superstructural or                             
instrumental to an overarching logic of capitalist accumulation; they are constitutive of capitalist                         
accumulation at a world­scale . The ‘colonial power matrix’ is an organizing principle involving exploitation                           
and domination exercised in multiple dimensions of social life, from economic, sexual, or gender relations,                             
to political organizations, structures of knowledge, state institutions, and households [emphasis added].”                       
(p.11) On this basis, he maintains that referring to “the present world­system [as] ‘capitalist’ is, to say the                                   
least, misleading. Given the hegemonic Eurocentric ‘common sense,’ the moment we use the word                           
‘capitalism,’ people immediately think that we are talking about the ‘economy’. However, ‘capitalism’ is only                             
one of the multiple entangled constellations of colonial power matrix of what I called, at the risk of sounding                                     
ridiculous, ‘Capitalist/Patriarchal Western­centric/Christian­centric Modern/Colonial World­System.’         
Capitalism is an important constellation of power, but not the sole one. Given its entanglement with other                                 
power relations, destroying the capitalist aspects of the world­system would not be enough to destroy the                               
present world­system. To transform this world­system it is crucial to destroy the historical, structural,                           
heterogeneous totality called the ‘colonial power matrix’ of the ‘world­system’ with its multiple forms of                             
power hierarchies.” (p.12) 
108  In this connection, and in the context of a critique of the view that rising wealth in the non­Western                                       
semi­peripheries of the modern/colonial world system appears to provide empirical evidence contradicting                       
arguments for the continued centrality of race as organizing principle, Boatcă (2017) maintains that the                             
reality of “semiperipheries more generally (Western and non­Western) in lending stability to the system by                             
replicating, mirroring and disseminating racialized mechanisms of endless accumulation of capital at                       
different levels in the structural hierarchy … does not amount to the nonwestern semiperipheries’ ability to                               
overturn  the racializing logic on which endless accumulation has been premised since the emergence of                             
the modern/colonial  world ­system , and should not be mistaken for it [emphasis added]” (p.2); going further                             
she states that “even if not all racists are white, racism in the world­system is premised on colonially                                   




uncritical embrace of Westphalian state-centrism in relation to the matter of Internet                       
governance  , resulting in the occlusion of non-statist political formations that                   109
transversally inform and inflect the issue, not to mention a certain ‘developmentalism’                       
at work in his line of argument  . Yet notwithstanding such criticisms, I would suggest                           110
that from a decolonial perspective, Abu Bhuiyan is surely correct in arguing that “with                           
the end of the modernization project, the US needed a new project to carry out its                               111
hegemony” and that “information society seems to be the new project.” (p.104)  112
 
4.3.2. Electronic Colonialism Theory (ECT) 
Abu Bhuiyan (2014) asks: “Which theory of international communication helps us                     
understand the role of the global south in Internet policymaking? Theoretical approaches                       
employed to explain interstate relationships regarding communication resources               
include cultural imperialism, the globalization paradigm, and regime theory. Of these                     
theoretical perspectives, cultural imperialism was the earliest, while the other two are                       
recent additions to communication studies.” (p.8) According to McPhail (2014), however,                     
109  For example, Abu Bhuiyan (2014) maintains that “global Internet politics is primarily a conflict between                               
states—the United States of America and the states of the global south—since the US controls Internet                               
policymaking. The states of the global south have been oppositional and acquiescent at the same time                               
toward US­sponsored Internet policies. They do not oppose the neoliberal policies promoted by the US,                             
but ask for an international framework to govern the Internet so that they can work as equal partners to the                                       
US in setting norms for the global Internet.” (p.8) Insisting on “the need to resort to state theory” (p.15), he                                       
maintains that “states are in the driving seat of Internet policymaking at both national and supranational                               
level. The US and the global south are two key actors here.” (p.16) Yet  is state­centrism the  appropriate                                   
frame in which to think about the Global South? 
110  Consider, in this connection the following statement: “Since northern societies have moved along the                             
path of the information society, southern societies cannot afford not to follow because the world is now                                 
more interconnected than before. Southern societies are now in many ways more dependent on the North                               
than before.” (p.113) I would suggest that Abu Bhuiyan here fails to engage – and  contest – the ontological                                     
‘horizon’ of development  per se insofar as his argument operates  within this horizon, seeking an­‘other’                             
development rather than, for example, a  post­development paradigm. 
111  Crucially, in relation to the line of argument presented herein, Abu Buiyan (2014) maintains that                               
“politically, there is little difference between the  values of the US and the EU, although they sometimes                                 
differ from each other on global political and economic issues.” (p.5) Similar to Barbrook (2007), Abu                               
Bhuiyan (2008) refers to the information society as “the new imperialist ideology” (p.112). 
112  Grosfoguel (2011) maintains that “during the last 510 years of the ‘Capitalist / Patriarchal /                               
Westerncentric / Christian­centric Modern / Colonial World­System’ we went from the 16 th Century                         
‘christianize or I shoot you,’ to the 19 th Century ‘civilize or I shoot you,’ to 20 th Century ‘develop or I shoot                                         
you,’ to the late 20 th Century ‘neoliberalize or I shoot you,’ and to the early 21 st century ‘democratize or I                                       
shoot you.’” (p.37) Drawing on Abu Buiyan’s analysis, it might be argued that Grosfoguel’s position needs                               
to be augmented with ‘informationalize or I shoot you’, such ‘informating’ assuming various forms                           
including, arguably, proposals to engage with the Internet of Things (IoT), a development which, I suggest,                               




“earlier attempts at theorizing have failed to develop models or research agendas that                         
match the reality of the contemporary role of global communication. Theories of                       
modernization, dependency, and cultural imperialism have failed to satisfactorily                 
explain global communication. The old theories only explain part of the global picture.”                         
(p.289) In place of such theories, he proposes Electronic Colonialism Theory (ECT) which                         
should be applied in combination with world systems analysis  . Originating in the                       113
1980s,  electronic colonialism is concerned with “the dependent relationship of poorer                     114
regions on the post-industrial nations which is caused and established by the                       
importation of communication hardware and foreign-produced software, along with                 
engineers, technicians, and related information protocols. These establish a set of                     
foreign norms, values, and expectations that, to varying degrees, alter domestic cultures,                       
languages, habits, values, and the socialization process itself.”(p.13) According to the                     115
originator of the theory, world system theory (WST) makes it possible “to decipher some                           
of the structural cleavages in the international communication field. It approaches the                       
nations of the world through an  economic lens” whereas ECT “basically views the world                           
through a  cultural lens. These two theories, WST and ECT, help unify the various                           
stakeholders as well as identify their collective impact on globalization.” (pp.vii-viii)                     
Insofar as a synthesis of WST and ECT engages with economics and culture, but does not                               
embrace the ‘decolonial turn’ vis-à-vis engaging with the persistent legacy system                     
effects of racialized colonialism and adopting a preferential option for the periphery, I                         
113  McPhail (2014) claims that “combining the two theories provides the most powerful explanation of the                               
contemporary phenomenon of global communication that is available to students, policy analysts,                       
corporate planners, and researchers alike.” (p.294) 
114  According to McPhail (2014), “over the course of history, there have been only a few major successful                                   
trends in empire­building”, viz. (1) military colonialism of the Greco­Roman period, (2) militant Christian                           
colonialism during the Crusades, and (3) mercantile colonialism commencing in the 17 th century CE up to                               
the mid­20 th century after which time it was superseded by electronic colonialism (pp.11­12). Interestingly,                           
he maintains that “the second phase, the brutal Christian Crusades against Muslims and other religions,                             
has reappeared” (p.303), thereby pointing to the ‘entanglement’ of race and religion in the modern/colonial                             
world system briefly discussed earlier in the present work. 
115  McPhail (2014) maintains that “whereas mercantile colonialism sought to control cheap labour and the                             
hands of labourers, electronic colonialism seeks to influence and  control the mind . It is aimed at  influencing                                 
attitudes ,  desires ,  beliefs , lifestyles, and consumer behaviour. As the citizens of peripheral nations are                           
increasingly viewed through the prism of consumerism, influencing and  controlling their  values ,  habits , and                           
purchasing patterns becomes increasingly important to multinational firms [emphasis added].” (p.13) I                       
would suggest that this way of thinking only deals with ‘one direction’ of the electronic – or rather,  digital –                                       
colonial project insofar as it fails to engage with more contemporary ‘extractive’ forms of digital colonialism                               




would suggest that this approach suffers from drawbacks similar to those evinced by the                           






In contrast to the aforementioned approaches, recent ‘critical’ engagements with                   
Internet governance and policy have tended to be framed in terms of Foucauldian                         
governmentality (Antonova 2014), Bourdieu’s field theoretic conception of capital                 
(social, economic and cultural) and/or Latourian actor-network theory (Pohle et al. 2016),                       
the latter being a preferred framing within STS (Musiani 2015). Complementing such                       
studies, in what follows, I shall attempt a preliminary decolonial  computing critique of                         
what has been described as the ‘core’ issue associated with Internet governance, viz. “the                           
problem of alignment” (Mueller 2017, p.71). My critique is informed by a consideration of                           
the body-politics and geo-politics of knowing (epistemology) and being (ontology) of                     
dominant, if not hegemonic, discursive stakeholders articulating the ‘nature’                 
(what-ness, how-ness) of Internet governance alignment. In addition, it should be                     
understood to be informed by an ethical commitment to embracing the ‘decolonial                       
option’, viz. preferential orientation towards those sited at the margins or borders of the                           
modern/colonial world system – the so-called ‘developing’, ‘Third’ or ‘Fourth’ ( sic ) world                       
that is the ‘Global South’ – motivated by a concern to effect compensatory (reparational,                           
corrective ) justice given coloniality, viz. the systemic regulatory structural logics                   116
informing the historical colonial project that are its persistent ‘legacy system’ effects in                         
the contemporary era. 
Granted that the Internet should be viewed sociotechnically as a network of networks                         
(Daigle 2015) and that its structure and governance are indeed  contingent phenomena                       
(Clark 2016), it is crucial to appreciate that neither currently nor  originally were these                           
infrastructural phenomena decentralised in nature (Mathew 2016)  . Building on this                   117
116  For an exploratory account, sketching out the contours of what is meant by ‘corrective’, as contrasted                                 
with ‘distributive’, justice, see (Mills 2017). 




line of analysis, I aver that the  what of the Internet cannot be separated from its  how and                                   
that the latter needs to be understood in terms of settlement or ‘sedimentation’ of power                             
manifested both through infrastructure (protocols, standards, commitments to               
openness, interoperability, end-to-end connectivity etc.), but also through dominant                 
worldview or ideology, the focus of the present study. Thinking about  how to decolonize                           
Internet governance necessitates considering the dating / history of this phenomenon in                       
relation to its location / geography. From a decolonial computing perspective, I maintain                         
that dating the onset of Internet governance to the last 25 years in relation to an                               
emerging governance of/by the Internet of Things (IoT) (Howard 2015), or dating its                         
‘prehistory’ to “the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s before the Internet                         
became the mass phenomenon it is today” (Ziewitz and Brown 2013), is problematic on                           
account of a certain Eurocentric/West-centric occlusion of the causally-overdetermined                 
and racially-inflected facilitating backdrop to the emergence of the Internet and its                       
governance structure(s) as described in Part I. In short, whether 25 years or almost 60                             
years, I suggest that such mainstream ‘core-centric’ accounts present far too truncated a                         
historical –  and geographical – frame within which to understand the (racial)                       
political-economy of Internet governance vis-à-vis the Internet and its governance as                     
phenomena embedded within the ‘horizon’ of the modern/colonial world. 
In what follows, I present a ‘close’ decolonial and critical race theoretical reading of some                             
standard works on Internet governance, viz. those of Mueller (2010, 2017) and DeNardis                         
(2014) with a view to disclosing – perhaps even ‘unmasking’ – the operation of colonial                             
logics informing their discourse  . These works have been ‘targeted’ for critique on                       118
account of their authoritativeness and ostensible representativeness vis-à-vis               
‘mainstream’ – that is, hegemonically-liberal – thinking about Internet governance in                     
relation to the matter of political alignment  . However, before presenting my critique, it                         119
118  In this connection, I want to argue for the need to relate concerns about  governance (rules, regulations,                                   
standards, institutions etc.) to  governmentality – that is the logic of power – albeit not necessarily in                                 
Foucauldian localizing terms. 
119  Commenting on an earlier draft of this essay, an anonymous reviewer asked how Internet governance is                                 
a  colonial construct, and how exactly  colonialism is present in concepts such as net neutrality, openness,                               
interoperability, etc.? I should like to argue that Internet governance is a  colonial construct insofar as both                                 
the Internet and its governance emerge in the context of a world system whose knowledge structures                               
continue to bear the imprint of a politics tacitly if not explicitly inflected with coloniality. If Mueller (2017) is                                     
correct in identifying the ‘core’ issue of Internet governance with (political) alignment, and insofar as the                               
world system continues to be marked by coloniality and/or white supremacy as a political system (Mills                               
1997), then Internet governance’s  de facto , if not  de jure , alignment is both racialized and colonial. In short,                                   
I want to suggest that if/when alignment is taken into consideration, and when alignment is understood in                                 
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According to DeNardis (2014), “the primary task of Internet governance involves the                       
design and administration of the technologies necessary to keep the Internet operational                       
and the enactment of substantive policy around these technologies. This technical                     
architecture includes layer upon layer of systems including Internet technical standards;                     
critical Internet resources such as the binary addresses necessary to access the Internet;                         
the DNS; systems of information intermediation such as search engines and financial                       
transaction networks; and network-level systems such as Internet access, Internet                   
exchange points, and Internet security intermediaries.” (pp.6-7) Crucially she maintains                   
that “Internet governance scholarship has historically focused close attention on two                     
areas: national regulatory frameworks and the governance role of ICANN and associated                       
institutions that manage critical Internet resources” (p.22), and that it is enacted via                         
various routes including technical design decisions, private corporate policies, global                   
institutions, national laws and policies, and international treaties (p.23)  . 120
According to van Eeten and Mueller (2012), “participants in the Internet governance field                         
take a distinctively global governance perspective on the topic. They look at the Internet                           
holistically as a globally interoperable system and think of governance as something                       
characteristic of it  as a system …” One consequence of this focus on the Internet as                               
systemic is that 
long durée world systemic terms, the colonial nature of Internet governance readily becomes apparent.                           
Regarding ostensibly ‘technical’ matters such as net neutrality, openness, interoperability, etc., I suggest                         
that insofar as these technical issues are actually  sociotechnical , interrogation of their  social dimension                           
necessitates interrogation of the social ‘background’ against which they operate. I would go further to                             
suggest that viewing such matters as (purely) technical in nature results in obfuscation of the ‘core’ issue                                 
of alignment, regardless of whether such a move is intentionally motivated or otherwise, and a focus on the                                   
politics of technical infrastructure and commitments to certain long­standing principles which appear                       
neutral yet are readily exposed as colonial when understood as ‘entangled’ with the issue of alignment. In                                 
this connection, DeNardis’ (2014, 2015, 2016) ostensible ‘bracketing’ of alignment as a ‘secondary’ matter                           
pertaining to  use relative to ‘primary’ technical concerns is particularly problematic. 
120  In a later work, DeNardis (2015) asserts that “much attention to Internet governance focuses on the                                 
global institutions of Internet governance (e.g. ICANN), content regulations, the public interest implications                         
of technical design, or, increasingly, the role of technology corporations in establishing public policy.” (p.8)                             




Scholars who are habituated to thinking of governance and regulation as                     
something that occurs at the national level may have trouble coping with                       
the new global institutions, and vice versa. This disjunction is reinforced by                       
the tendency to think of governance as being produced by, or taking place                         
in, formal organizations with explicitly institutionalized rules and               
procedures ... Thus, venues such as the ICANN, the Regional Internet                     
Address Registries, the WSIS or the IGF become valorized as the key sites of                           
Internet governance. The aggregate effect of decentralized decisions and                 
adjustments made by ISPs, other organizations that operate networks and                   
various jurisdictions, are not classified as part of the same process – even                         
though the latter often have much more profound effects on the evolution                       
and use of the Internet than the ICANN or IGF.” (p.727) 
For this reason van Eeten and Mueller are led to maintain that “the WSIS and IGF provide                                 
very little, if any, actual governance ... most of the stakeholders with actual control over                             
Internet resources are not participating in the IGF. The ICANN and the Regional Internet                           
Registries (RIRs) are the main actors for which a plausible claim can be made that they                               
shape the evolution and use of the Internet, but the governance of Internet identifiers                           
has only a limited impact on such matters as content regulation, security, intellectual                         
property and e-commerce.” (p.728) In this connection, van Eeten and Mueller maintain                       
that “the field assumes Internet governance to take place at these institutions and then                           
asks questions about the institutions themselves, rather than conceptualizing Internet                   
governance and studying where and how it is actually taking place” (p.729); further that                           
“in most areas, governance of the Internet takes place under … low formalization,                         
heterogeneous organizational forms and technological architectures, large numbers of                 
actors and massively distributed authority and decision-making power.” (p.730)                 
Crucially, on their view, such conditions “usually point to market and network                       
governance.” (p.731) Perhaps most significantly, they argue that “use of the label                       121
‘Internet governance’ needs to be re-thought and changed. The field would benefit                       
greatly from expanding to include innovative areas such as the economics of                       
cybersecurity, network neutrality, content filtering and regulation, copyright policing                 
121  In this connection, they maintain that “prices and markets, traditional hierarchical firms, hierarchical                           




and file sharing, and interconnection arrangements among ISPs.” On their view, “we                       
need a new conceptualization of governance that ... would accommodate the diversity of                         
governance on the Internet, from centralized, formal global institutions such as the                       
ICANN all the way to the emergent order that arises from the interactions among                           
thousands of ISPs and their users.” (p.730) 
 
7. The ‘Core’ Problem of Internet Governance: A Decolonial Interrogation 
Notwithstanding the brief account of the nature and location of Internet governance                       
vis-à-vis identification of issues, stakeholders, institutions etc. as presented above, in                     
what follows attention is focused on “the problem of alignment” which Mueller (2017)                         
insists is “the  core Internet governance question of our time” and “the arena for a                             
world-historic struggle between established institutions of communications governance               
and the new societal capacity created by globally networked digital devices [emphasis                       
added].” (p.71) In this connection, I want to suggest that a logic of racialized coloniality                             122
is deeply embedded in this ‘core’ and subject ‘the problem of alignment’ to decolonial                           
interrogation along three lines with a view to exposing (1) how certain phenomena are                           
deferred and/or ‘bracketed’ from consideration through discursive framing and                 
identification of actors in mainstream Internet discourse  ; (2) the operation of shared,                       123
albeit tacit , ideological dispositions informing the worldview of those producing such                     124
122  It is interesting to note here the difference between Mueller’s ‘core’ of Internet governance and                               
DeNardis’ (2014) reference to its ‘heart’ which she identifies with the following issues: “freedom of                             
expression online, Internet infrastructure security and stability, the policy role of Internet companies, the                           
efficacy of Internet protocols, globally coordinated Internet control systems such as the DNS, and the                             
relationship between intellectual property rights enforcement and Internet architecture.” (p.6) 
123  According to Mueller (2017), “to question alignment is to question key aspects of the geopolitical order                                 
that has been in place since the nineteenth century at least, and fully realized after World War II.” (p.73)                                     
However, I suggest the need to think about the modern/colonial world system as operative at a  deeper                                 
level than the Westphalian inter­state system. In the present work, I focus on Mueller’s core issue of                                 
‘alignment’, yet suggest that the way it is framed, viz. in terms of an opposition between statist and                                   
trans­statist network governance formations, is flawed, if not obfuscatory, from a decolonial perspective                         
insofar as it obscures consideration of the world systemic backdrop to the Internet governance debate. 
124  Throughout this work, my use of ‘tacit’ should be understood in the sense of implied, inferred, unspoken                                   
etc., and as ‘entangled’ with phenomena of silencing (erasure, occlusion etc.) However, it must be                             
emphasised that such ‘silencing’ should not be understood as necessarily intentional in the sense of                             
conscious or wilful; rather, as social­psychologically  dispositional and the result of embedded processes of                           




discourse; and (3) the need to interrogate the possibility of ‘rhetorical overplay’ in the                           
invocation of ‘network effects’  . 125
Common to different mainstream accounts of Internet governance is the identification                     
of essentially three types of actor and/or stakeholder, viz. states / governments, markets                         
/ corporations, and civil society participants (including NGOs), in both technical (setting                       
of standards, maintenance of infrastructure etc.) and policy-making capacities. What                   
tends to be obscured, intentionally or otherwise, in some of these accounts is a sense of                               
the  close coupling of hegemonic Western – more specifically, US – actors, both                         
governmental and corporate, at a crucial stage in the ‘developmental trajectory’ of the                         
Internet, viz. its transition from a communications technology built by the engineering                       
and academic community against the backdrop of the Cold War, to a facilitator of                           
commerce. Viewed in this light, Mueller’s (2017) insistence on separating out issues of                         
alignment (as political) from  fragmentation (as technical) should be seen as problematic                       
insofar as it indicates commitment to a liberal worldview vis-à-vis political economy,                       
moreover one in which the liberal political-economic orientation of the Internet  as a                         
sociotechnical phenomenon is somewhat obscured (whether intentionally or otherwise).                 
Contra Mueller, I want to suggest that hegemonic (US) motives behind the advocacy of                           
non-state Internet governance were  not historically rooted in concerns about co-option                     
of the technology in pursuit of nation-statist political ends, but rather in concerns about                           
how to most efficiently transition developmentalism to its next stage, viz. core-centric                       
‘network capitalism’ – or rather, network  colonialism  . 126
125  This line of critique is directed principally at Mueller (2017). For an account of how rhetoric can be                                     
intentional (in the sense of bearing traces of historically­sedimented prior intent) yet neither conscious nor                             
wilful, see (Farrell 1995). 
126  In this connection, Singh (2009) and Carr (2015) present useful accounts of the Clinton­Gore                             
administration’s support for transitioning the Internet (and web) into a commercial platform operative along                           
globalized, neoliberal lines. According to Singh, Clinton and Gore both “believed that the US government                             
should avoid regulating cyberspace activities, and urged the  private sector to lead the way in transforming                               
the digital world ... In Europe, other states were similarly inclined ... Governments  entrusted nonstate                             
actors to set rules, fearing that the rigidity of their own institutions would  slow or obstruct the development                                   
of information technology ... The private sector, with its free enterprise and competitiveness, was                           
considered better suited to take the Internet to the next stage [emphasis added].” (p.212) Carr (2015)                               
draws particular attention to this development in order to make the point that there is a  particular                                 
political­economic logic at work here, viz. US­hegemony through US­dominated neoliberalism; however, I                       
suggest thinking about this ‘baton­passing’ from state to non­state commercial actors in terms of the                             
militarized logics of colonialism, viz. colonizing states opening up colonized territories for commercial                         
exploitation. Singh, by contrast, is much more restrained in his analysis: “What led the US government to                                 
diffuse this technology throughout the world, which had its origins in the country’s security apparatus? The                               




Adopting a discourse theoretical position, Sayyid (2013) maintains that “given the                     
discursive character of social life it follows that social actors do not pre-exist any                           
discursive articulation but rather are products of it.” (p.280) From a decolonial                       
perspective, I suggest that this points to the need to disclose the tacit discursive                           
‘background’ operative within mainstream Internet governance discourse with a view to                     
revealing ‘silences’ (and erasures), irrespective of whether intentional (conscious, wilful                   
etc.) or otherwise, and the impact of such phenomena on the formation of actor /                             
stakeholder identities and their concerns. 
 
7.1.1. Governance and (Post-)Statism 
Adopting a state-centric point of departure, DeNardis (2014) maintains that  governance                     
“is traditionally understood as the efforts of sovereign nation states to regulate activities                         
within or through national boundaries” (p.11), and that it involves “the exercise of power                           
to enact a certain set of public interest goals” (p.23). Yet in the context of Internet                               
governance, she maintains that  privatized forms of governance “directly delegated from                     
government authorities to corporations” have emerged, and that “private corporations                   
enact policy not only in carrying out their core functions but also as actors responding to                               
events on a larger political stage.” (p.12) It is important to note here the tacit invocation                               127
in electronic commerce ... but  it’s too early to tell if state control and electronic commerce are co­joined ...                                     
Electronic commerce and state control are moving in tandem for now but not because commerce is                               
following flag or because the flag clearly understands its interest in electronic commerce terms [emphasis                             
added].” (p.220) Crucially, Carr (2015) maintains that “it was within this … context of the government taking                                 
initiative and ‘leading the private sector to water’, that Internet governance arrangements began to                           
develop” (p.646) and that “synergy between the dominant US private sector and the US government serve                               
to aggregate rather than balance or counter power in the multistakeholder process” (p.656); further, that                             
“the [private] sector derives legitimacy in the context of Internet governance from ... its discursive                             
alignment with civil society interests.” (p.655) On the matter of state­market or government­corporation                         
alignment, Howard (2015) maintains that Western governments and corporations have shown an                       
increasing tendency to ‘co­join’ in pursuit of ‘shared interests’. Yet what are these interests? Howard points                               
to national security concerns and the threats of cybercrime and cyberwar among other issues; however, if                               
the unit of analysis is shifted along decolonial lines, it might be argued that underpinning such ‘shared                                 
interests’ lies a possibly tacit commitment to maintaining, expanding and refining the operative racialized                           
logics of colonial modernity. In this connection, consider Carr’s (2015) assertion that “Internet governance                           
does have some distinctive features but it is a subset of challenges defined by shifts in ‘the character of                                     
global problems, the nature of actors, and the perceived limitations of international measures to govern the                               
planet’.” (p.644)  
127  Crucially, DeNardis (2014) maintains that a “confluence of issues – governmental privatization of some                             
state functions, the increasing influence of industry on esoteric areas of regulation, and the ways                             
multinational corporations have a de facto global policy making function – has called attention to                             
corporations as forces of public policy interventions. Recognition of the governance effects of private                           
 
138 
of a Westphalian state-centric conception of governance wherein the background                   128
operation of modern/colonial world systemic  governmentality remains undisclosed with                 
respect to ‘public interest goals’ and the ‘larger political stage’. 
According to Muller (2010), governance refers to “the coordination and regulation of                       
interdependent actors in the absence of an overarching political authority” (p.8), while                       
“global governance suggests that some steering and shaping function exists, but is less                         
hierarchical and authoritative. Thus, Internet governance is the simplest, most direct,                     
and inclusive label for the ongoing set of disputes and deliberations over how the                           
Internet is coordinated, managed, and shaped to reflect policies.” (pp.8-9) Explicitly                     
aiming to steer a course between cyber-libertarianism and state-centric political realism                     
in thinking about Internet governance, Mueller (2010) argues that “the Internet puts                       
pressure on the nation-state in five distinct ways. First, it globalizes the scope of                           
communication ... Second, it facilitates a quantum jump in the scale of communication ...                           
Third, it distributes control ... Fourth, it grew new institutions ... Finally, it changes the                             
polity.” (pp.4-5) In relation to the last of these points, he goes on to argue that “by                                 129
converging different media forms and facilitating fully interactive communication, the                   
Internet dramatically alters the cost and capabilities of group action. As a result,                         
radically new forms of collaboration, discourse, and organization are emerging. This                     
makes it possible to mobilize  new transnational policy networks and enables  new forms of                           
ordering has led some individual corporations and industry coalitions to develop voluntary and                         
self­regulatory business practices that adhere to certain ethical standards and social values.” (p.14) What                           
is somewhat obscured here, unintentionally or otherwise, is the tacit  ideological commitment to a liberal if                               
not neoliberal worldview informing such ethical standards and social values – moreover, a liberalism that is                               
de­raced / race­less and whose Eurocentric/West­centric orientation remains occluded. 
128  In this connection, DeNardis (2014) holds that “diffusion and privatization of governance, and private                             
reactions to governance delegation, does not in any way suggest the demise of territorial states in                               
regulating the Internet. Indeed, state control of Internet governance functions via private intermediaries has                           
equipped states with new forms of sometimes unaccountable and non­transparent power over information                         
flows.” (p.15) 
129  Mueller (2017) criticizes state­centric approaches to alignment on the grounds that “it is not about                               
defending territorial exclusivity, it is about eliminating barriers within a globalized virtual space.” (p.87) On                             
his view, the Internet “lowered the entry barriers to global power projection in the cyber domain. It created                                   
a public infrastructure that gives almost any well­organized actor the potential for transnational operations                           
in cyberspace.” (p.87) However, I want to suggest that this view is problematic insofar as Mueller does not                                   
consider that it is ‘standard operating procedure’ within colonialism to project developments originating                         
locally / nationally onto the global stage; in addition, no attempt is made to engage with  economic                                 
colonialism – or what McPhail (2015) refers to as ‘electronic colonialism’ – nor with the radical asymmetry                                 
in power between different actors. While Internet connectivity and access might facilitate ‘upwards mobility’                           
in  absolute terms – and even this claim is contentious given recent reports of an expanding digital divide                                   




governance as a solution to some of the problems of Internet governance itself [emphases                           
added].” (p.6) On his view, “it is possible to conceive of a different kind of political space                                 
more suited to the politics of Internet governance. One’s position in this space is defined                             
by  where one locates oneself in a space defined by two axes. The first pertains to the                                 
status of the territorial nation-state in communications governance. The second                   
identifies the level of hierarchy one is willing to countenance in the solution of Internet                             
governance problems [emphasis added].” (p.255) What is absent from such post-statist                     130
framing is any recognition of, let alone engagement with, the pre-statist reality of world                           
systemic colonial modernity as a long durée  transversal racial factor informing and                       
inflecting the policy of Western governments, corporations, NGOs and other emerging                     
actors. While appreciating what is  new , from a decolonial perspective, there is a need to                             
consider what is  old in the sense of persistent (re-iterated, reproduced) background                       
structuring logics  . 131
 
130  Consistent with his liberal / individualist worldview, Mueller refers to “where one locates oneself”,                             
thereby pointing to a certain decision power associated with identity­formation. Yet what about                         
body­political marking and geo­political location as  given in relation to the  a priori structures of coloniality                               
informing the modern world system? In this connection, I would suggest that Mueller’s bi­axial framework                             
is revealing insofar as global, transnational networking is framed as “denationalised liberalism” (p.256). 
131  Regarding the issue of network versus hierarchy (Mueller’s second axis), I want to suggest that this                                 
binary occludes the emergence of hubs resulting from the ‘entanglement’ of prior extant networks based                             
on asymmetric power relations and network effects operative in emerging networks, the latter of which                             
Mueller (2017) refers to repeatedly. In short, while hierarchies are, by definition, not ‘flat’, it should not be                                   
assumed that networks are either. Mueller (2010) has argued that a “key factor affecting one’s position in                                 
political debates is one’s stance toward the competing values of liberty and equality. Because the freedom                               
to exchange information and to associate with other network participants corresponds closely to                         
[denationalised liberalism], and because all forms of egalitarianism require a hierarchical power to level                           
differences and redistribute wealth, the liberty equality trade­off is to a large degree captured by the                               
network­hierarchy axis.” (p.259) Crucially, Mueller (2010) maintains that denationalised network “liberalism                     
is not interested ... in using global governance institutions to redistribute wealth. That would require an                               
overarching hierarchical power that would be almost impossible to control democratically; its mere                         
existence would trigger organized political competition for its levers, which would, in the current historical                             
context, devolve into competition among pre­existing political and ethnic collectivities.” (p.270) In response                         
to this, I suggest that insofar as networks are not flat, Mueller’s argument falls flat ( sic ), viz. it is incorrect to                                         
map the liberty­equality trade­off onto network­hierarchy structure. On the contrary, I maintain that                         
egalitarianism is only  contingently ­dependent on hierarchy and might be effected by other means including                           
those that are network­based. In addition, I should like to draw attention to Mueller’s rhetorical                             
characterization of networks as ‘peaceful’ and formed on the basis of ‘free association’ (p.257), and his                               
ideal ‘denationalised liberalism’ as involving “unilateral action in anarchic fields,” or the “peer production of                             
governance.” Contrary to Mueller, I should like to argue that networks are far from being free associations:                                 
given network effects and power laws in the context of extant asymmetric power relations, networks  can be                                 





According to DeNardis (2014), “Internet governance conflicts are the new spaces where                       
political and economic power is unfolding in the twenty-first century” (p.1), and she                         
points to “the rising privatization of global power and the embedded politics of technical                           
architecture” maintaining that “questions of governance at these control points are                     
questions of technical and economic efficiency but also expressions of mediation over                       
societal values such as security, individual liberty, innovation policy, and intellectual                     
property rights.” (p.2) Once again, what is somewhat obscured here, intentionally or                       132
otherwise, is tacit appeal to a  liberal framework of values wherein individualist concerns                         
are considered paramount while issues of social justice and egalitarian redistribution are                       
either marginalised or completely absent  . In defense of this rather ‘oppositional’                     133
critical race theoretical and decolonial reading of her position, consider DeNardis’                     
assertion that “the preservation of the Internet’s  stability and  security parallels other                       
global collective action problems that have cumulative effects on all nations [emphasis                       
added]” (p.16), which, I aver, points to a West-centric liberal prioritization of stability (or                           
order) relative to justice (or compensation)  . 134
132  DeNardis (2014) rightly argues that “arrangements of technical architecture [are] arrangements of                         
power” insofar as they “embed design decisions that shape social and economic structures ranging from                             
individual civil liberties to global innovation policy” (p.7), yet “the sometimes esoteric nature of these                             
technical governance mechanisms that keep the Internet operational belies the substantive public policy                         
decisions embedded in these mechanisms.” (p.9) 
133  Against this claim, it might be argued that DeNardis (2014)  explicitly states that “it is tempting to                                   
romanticize Internet architecture and governance as innately embodying democratic values of  equality ,                       
participatory openness, and multistakeholder oversight but there are several problems with this narrative                         
[emphasis added].” (p.15) However, I would suggest that the invocation of  equality itself points to a liberal                                 
worldview insofar as an  egalitarian commitment to reparations / compensation for the legacy system                           
effects of colonialism remains unarticulated, the tacit assumption perhaps being that  illiberal governments                         
(among ‘the Rest’) are responsible for a lack of parity between Internet governance stakeholders under a                               
multistakeholder arrangement. In support of this reading, consider that DeNardis goes on to state that “ in a                                 
significant portion of the world , Internet governance control structures do not embody democratic values                           
but involve systems of repression, media censorship, and totalitarian surveillance of citizens [emphasis                         
added].” (p.15) Yet DeNardis goes on to concede that “in parts of the world that do privilege freedom of                                     
expression online, there are nevertheless all­pervasive systems of data collection, retention, and sharing                         
that serve as the underlying business models enabling free email, search, social media, news, and other                               
forms of complementary information intermediation. This digital shadow of trading privacy for free private                           
goods serves as an agonistic check on notions of democratic online governance.” (pp.15­16) DeNardis                           
here refers to a ‘digital shadow’, but does not engage with the ‘dark underside’ of late capitalist modernity                                   
founded upon and reproductive of colonial logics. In short, what of the ostensible necessity of an                               
antagonistic / ‘oppositional’ check arguably required by a commitment to reparations based on an                           
understanding of the legacy system effects of racialized contractual global governance under colonial                         
modernity? 
134  According to DeNardis (2014), “the local value of stable and secure global Internet governance is                               




Similar to the way Mueller (2010, 2017) frames the issue of Internet governance in                           
state-centric terms, DeNardis (2015) maintains that “beyond the intrinsic public interest                     
implications embedded in keeping systems of Internet infrastructure operational,                 
another feature of Internet governance involves the phenomenon of governments                   
attempting to use the very infrastructure of the Internet for geopolitical objectives                       
having nothing to do with Internet operations.” (p.2) On her view, “exertion of state                           
power by seeking modifications to Internet architecture must be accompanied by                     
concern for the implications of these technical alterations for Internet stability and                       
security and the characteristics necessary to preserve or promote a free and open                         
Internet.” (p.9) DeNardis (2014, 2015, 2016) makes repeated appeal to the importance of                         
Internet ‘stability’, ‘freedom’ and ‘openness’, yet her rhetoric, informed by a                     
commitment to STS-based analysis, avoids any serious engagement with the                   
West-centric nature of Internet governance vis-à-vis the tacit embedded geopolitics of                     
Internet operations including both earlier technical and later civic and commercial                     
operations which occur against the backdrop of a hegemonic and West-centric                     
neoliberalism  . In short, no attempt is made to interrogate the colonial, let alone                         135




DeNardis (2016) maintains that “the  economic and social promise of bringing the next                         
billion people online usually assumes the ongoing growth and availability of a universal                         
Internet. But the Internet of the future has many possible trajectories. One                       
twenty-first-century Internet policy debate concerns whether cyberspace will continue                 
to expand into a universal network or fragment into disjointed segments based on                         
geographical borders or proprietary ecosystems.  Tensions between network universality                 
transactions, the movement of currency, and the exchange of financial securities ... No less than economic                               
security, modern social life, culture, political discourse, and national security are at stake in keeping the                               
Internet globally operational and secure.” (p.17) From a decolonial perspective, I would suggest that what                             
is somewhat obscured here is the role of Internet  stability in maintaining global West­centric hegemony at                               
the expense of global justice. For a useful discussion of the tension between prioritizing ‘order’ over justice                                 
in the context of the legacy system effects of racialized coloniality, see Pasha (2017b). 
135  As she states, her concern is with developing a proposal for “the technological characteristics and policy                                 




and enclosure reflect conflicts among public-interest values in cyberspace, such as                     
national security versus individual rights, and freedom of expression versus privacy                     
[emphasis added].” (p.1) Commenting on proposals to locate data within nation-state                     
boundaries, DeNardis (2015) argues that “‘holding’ data in a fixed location is                       
incompatible with engineering principles like reducing latency, load balancing, and                   
basic traffic engineering. It is also incommensurable with  business models predicated                     
upon global customer bases and workforces . As civil society advocates have expressed, it                         
moves the Internet from a de facto  universal network to a world with country-specific                           
‘Internets’ that don't connect with each other to form today's global network [emphases                         
added].” (p.5) While conceding that “a world with access divides, language barriers, and                         136
economic disparities hardly constitutes a universal Internet” (p.8), it is crucial to                       
appreciate (1) that the ‘digital divide’ is here being framed in somewhat reductive terms                           
of  access (rather than  use , not to mention  control and  ownership ), and (2) that an                             
economic backdrop of neoliberal globalization is tacitly being invoked, the implication                     
being that the ‘universality’ of the network is universally universal rather than                       
‘Eurocentrically universal’ (Wallerstein 2006) – that is, hegemonically West-centric  . In                   137
136  DeNardis (2015) goes on to maintain that “the desire for a consistent and universal system in which any                                     
device could reach any other device has always been a given for the public Internet.” (p.8) On her view,                                     
“data localization laws could result in the ‘Balkanization of the Internet’ and constitute a challenge to the                                 
‘free and open Internet that we benefit from today’.” (p.5) However, it is unclear whether such a ‘desire’ is                                     
as  universally held by Internet governance stakeholders / actors as implied; in addition, and returning to                               
the theme of ‘openness’ and ‘freedom’, this is a liberal, perhaps even neoliberal, narrative that obscures                               
the asymmetric nature of openness vis­à­vis who  can (actually) benefit from the Internet. According to Carr                               
(2015), “despite the US government emphasis on Internet Freedom, the US private sector has arguably                             
done more to ‘Balkanise’ the Internet than any other actor through the promotion and enforcement of                               
digital rights management and it has been able to rely upon US government support throughout. The                               
overlay of a sovereign map on top of the Internet has most effectively been established through a                                 
combination of location based services, intrusive software applications that exploit user privacy in return for                             
services and the promotion of international norms that allow for the control of information on commercial                               
but not cultural or political grounds.” (p.655) On the matter of ‘Balkanization’, Mueller (2017) rejects the use                                 
of this term in relation to the technical fragmentation of the Internet which he considers a near impossibility                                   
given network effects. An important issue to consider in relation to the invocation of ‘Balkanization’                             
concerns rather widespread Western tendencies to frame it in relation to oppositions between ‘Western                           
democratic’ and ‘non­Western autocratic’ (or authoritarian) state formations; in this connection, see (Sayyid                         
2005). 
137  In this connection, Mueller (2017) points to “the principle that the Internet should be unified and                                 
unfragmented” (p.4) which sat alongside commitments to ‘RESILIENCE’ and ‘STABILITY’ in the                       
NETmundial outcome document from 2014 (pp.4­5). For Mueller, “NETmundial was only one of the many                             
manifestations of  a world­embracing universalism or globalizing tendency that has always been present in                           
the technical vision of the Internet [emphasis added].” (p.5) What is obscured here, intentionally or                             




addition, I would suggest that framing the issue in terms of universality versus  enclosure                           
involves recourse to the historical experience of European feudalism while obscuring                     
historical colonialism and the persistence of racialized coloniality in core-periphery                   
relations. While not wanting to suggest any intent (conscious, wilful) on her part, I                           
suggest that such a move has the consequence of deterring the possibility of enclosure                           
(or protectionism) being seen as a temporary, tactical  resistant response on the part of                           
non-Western nations to the ongoing operation of the racialized political economic logics                       
underpinning Internet (web and social media) operations. 
 
7.1.5. Connectivity 
Regarding the issue of ‘connectivity’ as an intrinsic good, DeNardis (2016) maintains that                         
“while the digital realm is still in its infancy, this capacity to connect ubiquitously to the                               
Internet, regardless of location or access device, has become an implicit assumption of                         
the twenty-first century.” (p.1) Yet is this assumption ontological (factical) or                     138
deontological (normative)? In short,  is inter-connectivity an intrinsic good, and if so, why                         
is this held to be the case and by whom? Is this view ‘universally’ held? Given the                                 139
racialized colonial nature of the global political economy, is it not possible that reference                           
to ‘capacity to connect’ masks (obscures, occludes), albeit unintentionally, the possibility                     
of being connected by a hegemonic other – that is, to be colonized through connectivity?                           
 140
138  In this connection, Carr (2015) maintains that “the fact that the Internet  works on a functional level so                                     
very consistently is a significant triumph of global collaboration over competition” (p.643), yet insists that                             
“interpretations of what it means for the Internet to ‘work’ are subjective and this in itself is a question that                                       
should be opened up for debate.” (p.643) Further, that “beyond the most basic intent that the network                                 
functions in a reliable manner, there are many competing ideas about what constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘open’ or                                   
‘secure’ Internet. For example, an Internet that is secure for the producers of intellectual property is                               
primarily of interest to those who produce it, not those who consume it.” (p.652) It should be noted that                                     
Mueller's (2017) entire discourse ostensibly pivots around issues of  access and  consumption , issues of                           
production and hegemony tending to be ignored. 
139  DeNardis (2016, p.2) presents a graphic summarizing the results of an international survey into “How                               
much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? ‘Affordable access to the Internet should be                                 
a basic human right.’” It is interesting to note that all countries who  strongly agreed rather than merely                                   
somewhat agreed with the notion of affordable access being a basic human right are located in the Global                                   
South. Does this indicate a colonized mentality vis­à­vis internalization of the idea of the intrinsic goodness                               
of access and connectivity along with embrace of progressivist and developmentalist logics, or might it                             
point to attempts at ‘levelling’ the playing field through participation? Either way, I would suggest a certain                                 
failure to understand the racially colonised nature of Internet governance as hegemonically West­centric is                           
likely manifest. 
140  I aver that a similar line of critique applies regarding issues of ‘empowerment’ and ‘inclusion’ where                                 




According to Carr (2015), one key area to analyse in terms of the operation of discursive                               
framing is “the multi-stakeholder model of global Internet governance [which] has                     
emerged as the dominant approach to navigating the complex set of interests, agendas                         
and implications of our increasing dependence on this technology. Protecting this model                       
of global governance in this context has been referred to by the US and EU as ‘essential’                                 
to the future of the Internet.” (p.640) While critical of multistakeholderism on account                         141
of its tendency to obscure persistent asymmetric power relationships between different                     
stakeholders, Mueller (2010, 2017) and DeNardis (2014, 2015, 2016) nonetheless                   142 143
embrace some form of qualified commitment to this paradigm. This is significant when                         
considered in light of Mueller’s (2010, 2017) arguments for corralling the role of the                           
nation-state in Internet governance, ostensibly with a view to minimizing the prospects                       
for politicization of the Internet  ; however, adopting “a Gramscian approach to                     144
building the necessary infrastructure is not only possible, but will empower citizens to participate in the                               
global digital economy, access knowledge and engage in lawful communication with others, regardless of                           
location or type of device.” (DeNardis 2016, p.1) 
141  According to Carr (2015), “multi­stakeholderism has become almost synonymous with global Internet                         
governance” (p.641), and “the discursive power of ... concepts [associated with multistakeholderism] is as                           
significant and as interesting as the power that is generated through the actual functions and practices                               
they refer to.” Crucially, Carr maintains that “multi­stakeholder Internet governance serves largely to                         
reinforce existing power relations rather than disrupt them. Specifically, the multi­stakeholder model in                         
Internet governance privileges the interests of those actors that were instrumental in establishing it – the                               
US government  and those whose interests align with a US agenda [emphasis added].” (p.642) 
142  Mueller (2010) maintains that “at worst, it offers a simple­minded communitarianism that implies that all                               
political, economic, and social conflicts can be resolved if everyone involved just sits down and talks about                                 
them together. By focusing almost exclusively on the interaction or dialogue among stakeholders, it tends                             
to evade or ignore issues of rights, access, power, and related issues of institutional design.” (pp.264­265) 
143  According to Carr (2015), “DeNardis argues that the decentralised and diverse nature of                           
multi­stakeholder Internet governance is its strength and indeed, she regards it as a major factor in the                                 
‘resilience, stability and adaptability of the Internet’ ... [Yet] one of the fundamental problems with the                               
current arrangements is that rather than disperse power to a wide range of actors, multistakeholderism                             
reinforces existing power dynamics that have been ‘baked in’ to the model from the beginning. It privileges                                 
north­western governments, particularly the US, as well as the US private sector.” (p.658) In this                             
connection, it should be noted that DeNardis concedes that “global Internet choke points do exist. Despite                               
the decentralized physical geography of the Internet and the diversity of institutions overseeing this                           
infrastructure,  there are centralized points of control . Some are virtual; some are physical; some are                             
virtually centralized and physically distributed. All are increasingly recognized as points of control over                           
Internet infrastructure [emphasis added].” (p.11) This view arguably contrasts somewhat with that of                         
Mueller (2010) for whom “most of the real­world governance of the Internet is  decentralized and emergent ;                               
it comes from the interactions of tens of thousands of network operators and service providers – and                                 
sometimes users themselves – who are connected through the Internet protocols [emphasis added].” (p.9) 
144  In this connection, Carr (2015) points to “a persistent concern that involving states in Internet                               
governance practices and processes will see the Internet mired in politics.” (p.652) Yet I would suggest that                                 
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hegemonic power [which] focuses on controlling narratives, setting the agenda and                     
defining the terms of reference in order to minimise (or delegitimise) dissent” (p.642),                         
Carr maintains that “the narrative about the need to limit government involvement in                         
multi-stakeholder Internet governance does not impact on all states to the same extent.                         
Because the US has been so successful in embedding its view in multi-stakeholder                         
Internet governance practices, functions and norms, it and states aligned ideologically                     
with its ‘Internet Freedom’ approach can afford to promote a view of limited government                           
involvement. Essentially, this serves to limit  oppositional government input.” (p.653)                   145
Moreover, “limiting government involvement relative to other stakeholders however, is                   
essential to  maintaining the status quo in Internet governance – an outcome that is most                             
favourable to those actors that helped establish it in the first place [emphasis added.”                           
(p.651) While it might be argued that Mueller (2010, 2017) explicitly rails against                         
US-centrism, it is crucial to appreciate that his criticism is directed at US-centrism in the                             
statist  terrain of government, not at the US-centric ‘free market’  . 146
Adopting a position informed by feminist and postcolonial thought, Franklin (2009)                     
argues that “translocal, transnational, and supraterritorial trajectories and alliances                 
overlay domestic–international demarcation lines as multilateral institutions broker               
‘multi-stakeholder’ meetings” and that “the terrain (the whereabouts), the actors (the                     
‘‘who’’), the stakes (what is it all about), and the means, are  increasingly multi-sited and                             
multidimensional rather than vertically integrated, geographically contained,             
analogically disseminated [emphasis added].” (p.223) On this basis she insists that                     
“reducing everything to a Manichean battle between the State and its Discontents … can                           
also mean missing crucial nuances, opportunities, and moments for resistance and                     
change as the script, casting, location, and final production are finalized.” (p.225)                       
the Internet is, and always was, politicized; further, it is a liberal conceit to assume that the site of politics                                       
lies with states to the exclusion of markets. 
145  Crucially, Carr (2015) maintains that “diplomatic leveraging is very much a part of global Internet                               
governance”, drawing attention to “the diplomatic power of the US and its supporters like Australia and the                                 
EU” (p.654). I would suggest that what is missing here is recognition of a ‘factor’ that  transversally informs                                   
and inflects alignment in the modern/colonial world system, viz. race; in this connection, see Lake and                               
Reynolds (2008). In short, notwithstanding the importance of her Gramscian line of critique, Carr (2015)                             
arguably shares the same de­raced / un­raced understanding of the world system as liberal commentators                             
such as Mueller and DeNardis in referring to “the dominance of liberalism in the last quarter of the 20th                                     
century” (p.643), yet failing to appreciate  actual historical liberalism as fundamentally racialized. 
146  In this connection, Carr (2015) holds that “attempts to limit government involvement in the                             




Granted, yet if the decolonial framing of the issue as presented herein is accepted,                           
insofar as decoloniality is only contingently framed in  state -centric terms, it might be                         
that such a line of argument does not hold true in respect of the world system  per se  . I                                     147
should also like to suggest that such ‘postcolonial’ framings, maked by a focus on the                             
local , viz. ‘the State and its Discontents’, tend to obscure the possibility of thinking about                             
non-Western statist interventions in relation to a decolonial project aimed at  globally                       
decentering West-centric domination of the Internet  . 148
 
7.1.7. Identity and the Digital Divide 
According to DeNardis (2014), “the study of Internet governance is a much narrower                         
scholarly field of inquiry within the realm of Internet research just as the practice of                             
Internet governance is narrower than the broader area of information and                     
communication technology policies.  To draw these boundaries , it helps to explain what                       
the field addresses versus what it typically does not address [emphasis added].” (p.19)                         
Crucially, on her view, “these boundaries are narrower than the capacious topics                       
addressed in some venues, such as the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF),                         
which have included topics on  the digital divide , digital education, and how the Internet                           
is used generally [emphasis added].” (p.20) DeNardis goes on to assert that “Internet                         
governance questions address technological design and administration, issues generally                 
distinct from questions about content” (p.20) and that “examples of content-related                     
topics generally  outside the field of Internet governance include ...  societal usage issues                         
including  digital equality ,  social media communities , or  identity formation and human                     
interconnectedness ... Global Internet governance concerns generally do not address                   
patterns of Internet usage by various constituencies [emphasis added].” (pp.20-21)                   149
147  As should be apparent at this point in the presentation, I suggest that state­centric readings fail to                                   
adequately theorize – and ‘name’ – global hegemonic power, viz. racial coloniality, and that Franklin is                               
‘guilty’ of such a failure. 
148  Adopting a similar post­structuralist position to Franklin, Singh (2009) has argued that “if interactions                             
change actor identities and meaning of the issues they pursue, actor preferences cannot be taken as                               
constant as do structural analysis where power structures determine preferences prior to any interaction.”                           
(p.220) I am inclined to think that this line of argument affords too much agency to non­statist resistant                                   
formations and occludes the operation of historically­sedimented dispositional logics, which are                     
non­determinative yet structurally­biasing in the  global context of core­periphery relations under colonial                       
modernity. In addition, and as will be argued in Section 7.3, network effects operative in the Internet (web                                   
and social media) mean that while the  location of hegemonic power – and thereby its  identity – might                                   
shift/morph into a more diffuse formation, such power  remains core­centric and racialized. 
149  According to DeNardis (2014), “the objects of Internet governance inquiry are technical architecture, the                             
private and public entities and rules that control this architecture, and policies about this architecture.                             
 
147 
Mueller (2017) is even more emphatic about the need to exclude the digital divide from                             
Internet governance discourse arguing, in the context of a discussion about Internet                       
fragmentation, that “while it is certainly true that those who have no access to the                             
Internet are not able to communicate over the Internet, it is  absurd to bundle this                             
problem –  which is both undesired and unintended – with intentional decisions to block                           
users from accessing services or content that they are fully equipped to reach. Access                           
limitations caused by a lack of development constitute a  limited Internet, but not a                           
fragmented one [emphasis added].” (pp.32-33) Yet from a decolonial and critical race                       
theoretical perspective, I would suggest it is far from clear that the digital divide was                             
‘both undesired and unintended’ given its ‘entanglement’ with prior ‘divides’ under                     
colonial modernity, and the goal, whether tacit or explicit, of maintaining                     
Eurocentric/West-centric hegemony under contestation . Beyond this, there is               150
Mueller’s reference to a ‘lack of development’ to consider in terms of its appeal to                             
developmentalist logic and rather unfortunate ostensible framing as a ‘blame the victim’                       
narrative. 
While accepting that Internet governance is “a complex matrix of technical standard                       
setting, resource allocation, legal arrangements and the control of access and                     
information online” (Carr 2015, p.645)  , and ostensibly targeting DeNardis (2014, 2015,                     151
2016), Carr goes on to state that “very often in debates about global Internet governance,                             
the  focus is on  technical coordination which is much easier to agree upon. This is                             
obviously a significant element of Internet governance but very often, technical                     
decisions and standards have political implications that cannot and should not be                       
ignored. Framing Internet governance as ‘technical’ provides a discursive mechanism                   
for inoculating the issues from important and inescapable political debates [emphases                     
added].” (p.644) From a decolonial perspective, I want to argue that excluding – or                           152
Studying Internet governance generally does not address the effects of Internet use or the meaning of                               
content but does address the technologically mediated control of content or the rights of users in accessing                                 
this content.” (p.21) 
150  In this connection, I should also like to draw the reader’s attention to the earlier discussion of the Cold                                       
War origins of the Internet and the shift in roles of state/government and market/commerce vis­á­vis                             
maintaining U.S. hegemony as the Global North entered a purported ‘information age’. 
151  I would suggest that focusing on  access serves to occlude, albeit unintentionally, issues of usage,                               
ownership and control. 
152  From a decolonial perspective, such debates would involve interrogating commitments to stability,                         




‘bracketing out’ – the digital divide from Internet governance is a pivotal move in terms                             
of setting – and ‘policing’ – the boundaries of what constitutes  legitimate Internet                         153
governance discourse from a tacitly liberal, if not neoliberal, perspective. DeNardis’                     
drawing of boundaries is a tacitly  political move in that the decision to separate concerns                             
about content and issues to do with the promotion of digital equality – not to mention a                                 
commitment to reparations (compensation, corrective justice) for the legacy system                   
effects of colonialism – from Internet governance results in maintenance of the status                         
quo and its reinforcement via network effects  . Crucially, this way of framing the                         154
contours of Internet governance  discourse – or terms of the ‘language game’ –                         155
functions to determine the identities of Internet governance stakeholders / actors                     156
insofar as excluding consideration of the digital divide / digital inequality results in                         
deterring and deferring decolonial interrogation of the racialized ontology of Internet                     
governance actors  . 157
 
7.2. Ideological Assumptions 
According to Mueller (2010), “to make sense of our environment we must be able to name                               
phenomena, come up with explanations, and develop guidelines about how to respond. In                         
such an environment it is not only discrete ideas, but also ideologies that become                           
important. Ideologies are systems of ideas that strive to provide coherent explanations                       
153  Such ‘policing’ might be understood in Foucauldian terms, viz. as the disciplining effects of the                               
knowledge/power regime of Internet governance discourse. 
154  In this connection, and in the context of the WSIS, Abu Buiyan (2014) draws attention to the fact that                                       
“the global south opposed the ICANN model of Internet governance and proposed to  expand the rubric of                                 
the Internet governance framework by including measures related to the digital divide , multilingualism,                         
Internet security, and intellectual property rights. It opposed unilateral US control of the Internet root and                               
demanded equal participation [emphasis added].” (p.18) 
155  According to Murphy (2002), “different groups will make different rules that will structure the use of a                                   
technology. These rules become policies governing the networks. People with an opportunity to gain                           
access to a network must accept the rules by which the system is structured.” (p.30) While accepting that                                   
such rules will emerge as outcomes of struggle / contestation for hegemony, it is important to appreciate                                 
that in the case of the Internet, many of these systems – or layers – of rules (protocols, standards) have                                       
already become sedimented. 
156  Mueller (2017) maintains that “there is no denying the linkage between group identities and state                               
formation”(p.138), yet goes on to ask whether “the community connected via cyberspace [is] capable of the                               
kind of solidaristic identity sufficient to forge a political unit” (p.139). I would suggest this is a state­centric                                   
reading of the relationship between statism and identity­construction and that it is quite possible to                             
conceive of political identity in alternative terms, for example, in relation to body­political marking and                             
geo­political situatedness in a racialized world system. 
157  Carr (2015) might argue that DeNardis’ framing is West­centric and hegemonic in the Gramscian sense                               




across a wide range of social, economic, and political phenomena. Political ideologies                       
tend to fuse the normative and the positive; they provide a framework for analysing                           
events and evaluating or recommending specific courses of action in line with a set of                             
values.” (p.254) Crucially, and as stated earlier, what is obscured here, intentionally or                         
otherwise, is the role of ideologies in occluding (blocking, deterring, deferring) other                       




In the context of discussing whether we are in a digital cold war, Mueller (2013) asks                               
whether “there [is] an ideological division in the world comparable to the                       
capitalism/democracy vs. socialism/communism dichotomy”, arguing that “in the               
Internet sphere, yes there is – partially. But a vitally important historical distinction is                           
that this division is not led or defined by states.” On his view, “there is an ideological                                 
division around two distinct issues. The first is the appropriate institutional form of                         
Internet governance, the other pertains to the substantive aspects of communications                     
policy.” Crucially, in relation to the issue of governance forms, he maintains that                         
“ younger states and  authoritarian states favour a pre-eminent role for sovereigns in                       
communications policy, and would rely on the negotiation of intergovernmental                   
158  In this connection, and expounding on the Lacanian psychoanalytic idea of ‘foreclosure’, Hesse (2014)                             
maintains that “foreclosure refers to the preemptive exclusion of possible references and their locutions                           
from the realm of the symbolic, the field of representation or discourse. Although foreclosure is a structural                                 
feature of all discourse, of interest are the hegemonic effects of specific strategies, since what is                               
foreclosed is the possibility of particular representations. Hence certain redacted themes or objects                         
become unsayable, lacking in referentiality because they are routinely prohibited by the conventions or                           
rules of what can be formulated in a particular discourse. Foreclosure makes certain expressions                           
impossible, insofar as the locutions that would allow that expression have already been denied any                             
existence within the valorized discourse ... Foreclosure makes it possible for some things to be formulated                               
in what is said, written, or represented and others not. The ‘action of foreclosure’ is repetitive and quotidian                                   
because its proscription of particular discursive terms, themes or questions is never finalized; the                           
conventional, hegemonic or normalizing discourse remains ever threatened by what has in effect been                           
constitutively foreclosed. This suggests that political and hegemonic strategies can be invested in seeking                           
to secure particular repetitions of the conditions of impossibility and possibility in what is thinkable and                               
sayable.” (p.290) 
159  Significantly, Epstein (2010) holds that historical factors “can be constitutive of concepts themselves ...                             
not just causes for why concepts have arisen.” (p.14) Consider, in this connection, Mueller’s (2017)                             
statement that “not until the US­imposed post­WW2 postcolonial order was in place can one clearly say                               
that the international system was based on a society of sovereign nation­states.” (p.153)                         
Decolonially­speaking, this statement is problematic insofar as the postcolonial era is marked by the                           




agreements for global governance. The other side, which is led not by specific states but                             
by private sector actors in the technical community, business, and to some extent civil                           
society, supports the organically developed Internet institutions (Mueller, 2010), which                   
represent transnational governance and more open, bottom-up, participatory               
institutional mechanisms [emphasis added].” Somewhat provocatively, I want to suggest                   
that there might be a certain tacit Orientalism at work here in ‘bracketing’ reference to                             
younger states with  authoritarian states  ; perhaps even more controversially, that the                     160
adjective ‘younger’ might not be used here simply to mean ‘newer’ but also in the sense                               
of ‘less mature’, thereby indicating tacit, albeit possibly unintentional (in the sense of                         
unconscious, not wilful etc.), invocation of a  developmentalist conception of racialized                     
coloniality. I suggest that this argument is supported by Mueller’s assertion that                       
increased nation-statist intervention vis-à-vis Internet governance should be viewed as a                     
retrograde step, viz. “the  younger nation-states – the ones that only just emerged in the                             
post WW2 period – seem to be the most strongly committed to a  backwards-looking ,                           
sovereigntist or neo-Westphalian approach to Internet governance [emphasis added].”                 
(Mueller 2013) In this connection, it should be noted that McPhail (2014) provides the                           
basis for quite a different reading, arguing that “two major changes occurred during the                           
late 1950s and early 1960s that set the stage for the fourth and current era of empire                                 
expansion ... [1] the rise of nationalism and decolonization, centred mainly in developing                         
nations, and [2] the shift to a service-based information economy among core nations.                         
The service economy relies substantially on satellites, telecommunications, and                 
computer technology to analyse, transfer, and communicate information. It renders                   
obsolete traditional national borders and technological barriers to communication.”                 
(p.12) In short, just as the periphery was entering into a period of nation building, the                               161
160  Against this, it might be argued that Mueller (2013) maintains that “in many respects, the battle over the                                     
vision of Internet governance cannot be characterized entirely accurately as between  authoritarian,                       
undemocratic states and  liberal, freedom­loving states, but also and more centrally as a conflict between                             
long­established, cosmopolitan states and newer states still insecure about their sovereignty [emphasis                       
added]”. Notwithstanding this statement, I would suggest that recourse to the idea of ‘cosmopolitanism’                           
coupled with a certain tacit commitment to developmentalist logic arguably speaks to the contrary. 
161  Crucially, McPhail (2014) maintains that “cultural reproduction theorists view international media                       
initiatives as a means of reproducing and socializing students in peripheral nations into knowledge                           
systems that make them more compatible with Western ideals and, equally important, Western consumer                           
values.” (p.28) I suggest this extends to the knowledge system that pertains to the discourse on Internet                                 
governance which is dominated by ‘Northern’ voices tacitly committed to liberal, neoliberal and/or                         
libertarian capitalist political­economic paradigms. However, it should be noted that from a decolonial                         




core transcended nationalism to transnational globalization, viz. an ‘iterative’ shift                   
within the developmental logics of a ‘programmatic’ racialized coloniality that I suggest                       
was intended to perpetuate – if not widen – a relation of ‘parallel development’ between                             
core and periphery . 162
 
7.2.2. Rhetorical (Racial) Liberalism 
Mueller (2010, 2017) explicitly  , and DeNardis (2014, 2015, 2016) somewhat more                     163
implicitly, champion a commitment to political and economic liberalism. For example, in                       
the context of a critique of the notion of cyberwar, again framed in relation to concerns                               
about a possible digital cold war, Mueller (2013) claims that “cybersecurity                     
threat-mongering actually militates against the Internet freedom agenda of the liberal                     
democratic states. It leads to the concentration and centralization of power (both                       
political and economic) not to its decentralization and diffusion.” In addition to the need                           
to problematize the centralization–decentralization argument  , I want to suggest that                   164
Mueller’s rhetorical appeal to liberal democracy obscures, albeit unintentionally, the                   
historical fact that liberalism as a political and economic philosophy was conceived in                         
the European cum Western core  in relation to illiberal colonial practices carried out by                           
core states in the periphery; further that  actual liberalism as opposed to  ideal liberalism                           
was – and arguably remains – thoroughly racialized in nature. Contrary to Mueller, I                           
maintain that liberalism was  never about ‘global diffusion and decentralization of                     
162  Crucially, I want to insist that this view should not be seen as belonging to the genre of ‘conspiracy                                       
theory’; rather, that it should be understood as a historically­informed decolonial and critical race                           
theoretical analysis of  possible responses of/by hegemonic white colonial formations to contestation. 
163  Mueller (2010) states that his “normative stance is rooted in the Internet’s early promise of unfettered                                 
and borderless global communication, and its largely accidental and temporary escape from traditional                         
institutional mechanisms of control. The expectations and norms created by the early Internet were                           
radically liberal in nature, and gave new vitality to ideals of freedom of expression in politics and culture,                                   
and to concepts of freedom of exchange and open, competitive entry into information and communication                             
markets in the economic sphere [emphasis added].” (p.5) He goes on to assert that he is “using the terms                                     
liberal and  liberalism the way Europeans use them (i.e., in their correct, historical sense).  Liberalism                             
means policies and philosophies that favour individual liberty and choice.” (p.262) Mueller (2010) criticises                           
US­centric right­wing market liberalism (pp.262­263), yet ostensibly fails to appreciate that  actual liberalism                         
operative in the world was –  is – structurally­informed by racism, and how this racial factor might function                                   





power’, but at most its  partial diffusion  locally among core states along a ‘racial gradient’                             
of whiteness  . 165
According to Mills (1997), during colonialism, “the polity was usually thought of in racial                           
terms, as white ruled, and this perspective would become global in the period of formal                             
colonial administration. Political theory is in part about who the main actors are, and for                             
this unacknowledged polity they are neither the atomic individuals of classic liberal                       
thought nor the classes of Marxist theory but races.” (p.113) More recently, Deneen                         166
(2018) has argued that liberalism is built on a foundation of contradictions: it trumpets                           
equal rights while fostering incomparable material inequality; its legitimacy rests on                     
consent, yet it discourages civic commitments in favour of privatism; and in its pursuit                           
of individual autonomy, it has given rise to the most far-reaching, comprehensive state                         
system in human history. However, following Mills and others, I would suggest that it is                             
not so much a case of  contradictions , implying oppositions  within a shared ‘horizontal’                         
space, viz. society, but rather a case of ‘structurally-relational’ oppositions operating                     
between racialized ‘vertical’ zones  . Crucially, Mills maintains that “racial liberalism” is                     167
the central ideological formation of the modern Western political tradition, global white                       
supremacy’s self-legitimating master narrative, and that  ideal liberalism is an  idealised                     
fiction grounded in  actualised violence towards what it designates as the illiberal ‘other’,                         
the subject of colonialism, genocide, slavery and war  . 168
165  For detailed accounts of the racialized origins and operations of liberalism, see Mills (1997, 2015, 2017)                                 
and Losurdo (2011); for a more general critique of Western culture as racist, Western state formations as                                 
racial, and the operation of racialized logics under neoliberalism, see (Goldberg 1993, 2002, 2008). 
166  Mills (1997) goes on to state that: “the absence from most white moral/political philosophy of                               
discussions of race and white supremacy would lead one to think that race and racism have been marginal                                   
to the history of the West. And this belief is reinforced by the mainstream conceptualizations of the polity                                   
themselves, which portray it as essentially raceless, whether in the dominant view of an individualist liberal                               
democracy, or in the minority radical Marxist view of a class society.” (p.121) However, “black activists                               
have always recognized white domination, white power (what one writer in 1919 called the ‘whiteocracy,’                             
rule by whites), as a political system of exclusion and differential privilege, problematically conceptualized                           
by the categories of either white liberalism or white Marxism.” (p.131) 
167  Seminal decolonial theorist Frantz Fanon describes this in terms of ‘the line of the human’ separating                                 
the zone of being or whiteness (which Mills describes as the space occupied by ‘persons’) from the zone of                                     
non­being or blackness (that is, the space occupied by those racialized as sub­persons / non­persons). 
168  I should point out, for the record, that Mills (2017) is not dismissive of liberalism  per se . On his view                                         
liberalism “has been  complicit with rather than  condemnatory of group subordination”, yet “black radical                           
liberalism reverses these normative priorities and makes corrective justice its central concern. Marxism is                           
accurate in seeing exploitation as central to the polity but weak on normative theorization (Marx’s original                               
dismissal of ‘rights’ and ‘justice’ as bourgeois concepts). Hence the need for a synthesis with liberalism.”                               
(p.209) Yet is such a black radical synthesis with liberalism consistent with the latter’s commitment to the                                 
autonomy of the individual, minimal state interference and a ‘free­market’ economy? In short, arguments                           
against essentialism notwithstanding, is it ultimately coherent to invoke the signifier liberalism in opposition                           
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If Mills and others are correct about the history (and contemporary reality) of  actual                           
liberalism, how should one view – and, more daringly, attempt to explain (or make sense                             
of) – Mueller’s explicit and DeNardis’ implicit commitment to mainstream – that is,                         
racialized – versions of the liberal project? Perhaps the answer to this question has to do                               
with the tacit operation of what Mills (1997) refers to as the ‘epistemology of ignorance’,                             
which he refers to in a later work, more specifically, as the phenomenon of ‘white                             
ignorance’ (Mills 2007, 2915b). According to Mills (1997), a ‘very limited number’ of                         
(racial) differences were  intentionally selected by those responsible for establishing the                     
modern racial world system  ; however, subsequent to its establishment, the system has                       169
been maintained by what he refers to as an “inverted epistemology, an epistemology of                           
ignorance, a particular pattern of localised and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are                       
psychologically and socially functional)” that involve “white misunderstanding,               
misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race” (pp.18-19)  .                   170
Crucially, white ignorance “should be seen as a particular optic, a prism of perception                           
and interpretation, a worldview [and] whatever the overarching theoretical scaffold,                   
‘whiteness’ needs to be playing an appropriate causal role in explaining the generation of                           
mistaken cognitions; it cannot be merely a matter of ignorance among people who are                           
white. The possible causal factors are multiple (and not at all necessarily mutually                         
exclusive):  socialization into a racist belief-set or  a Eurocentric normative starting-point ,                     
inherited culture and tradition , inculcated social amnesia, typically skewed inferential                   
pattern, deficient conceptual apparatus,  material group interest , or epistemically                 
to such liberal principles, not to mention the failure resulting from the successful application of those                               
principles? 
169  Invoking contractarian thinking, Mills  methodologically (as opposed to literally) describes this in terms of                             
the putative ‘signing’ of a ‘Racial Contract’. 
170  Importantly, Brubaker et al. (2004), along with others, have shown that perception is conditioned by                               
conceptual categories and classifications that are socially­informed which means that what and how things                           
are perceived will, to some extent, reflect the power relations existing in a given society. According to Mills                                   
(2007), it is this fact of social cognition (conception, perception) that helps to explain what was previously                                 
described as an ‘epistemology of ignorance’ under conditions of systemic racism or white supremacy. It is                               
important to appreciate that Mills’ approach is fundamentally  epistemological and  normative , focusing on                         
‘white ways of knowing’ in which racialized cognition is characterised as ‘ignorant’ and ‘misinformed’,                           
whether passively and actively. In this connection, I suggest that his account contrasts somewhat starkly                             
with poststructuralist decolonial readings which see racism as both  rational and  normative relative to the                             
project of maintaining white supremacy (Goldberg 1993), thereby indicating, against Mills, the absence of a                             
universal, ‘foundationalist’ vantage point from which to determine the moral / ethical correctness or                           




disadvantaged social-structural location [emphases added].” (Mills 2015b, p.218) On                 171
this basis, I want to suggest that an inherited, sedimented background of Eurocentrism /                           
West-centrism informs the ‘material group interests’ and shapes (bounds, limits) the                     
discursive ‘horizons’ of mainstream Internet governance commentators such as Mueller                   
and DeNardis  . 172
Regardless of whether the above ‘explanation’ is correct and accepted as such or                         
otherwise, I would suggest that Mueller’s and DeNardis’ advocacy of liberalism vis-à-vis                       
Internet governance is decolonially untenable, and that their appeal to a                     
multistakeholderism that includes state/government, market/corporations, NGOs and             
various other organizations including those concerned and charged with maintaining                   
the technical operation (stability, openness, connectivity, interoperability etc.) of the                   
Internet must be viewed as suspect in that it fails to take into consideration the                             
fundamental ‘entanglement’ of states and markets (and other actors) within the                     
overriding and underpinning systemic logic of racialized liberalism  . 173
 
7.2.3. A (Racialized) Network Nation 
Consistent with the critique of statist alignment of Internet governance outlined in                       
(Mueller 2010), Mueller (2017) presents four main arguments in favour of a shift to                           
171  Put simply, Mills (2015b) maintains that “the political economy of racial domination required a                             
corresponding  cognitive economy that would systematically darken the light of factual and normative                         
inquiry [emphasis added].” (p.217) 
172  Mills (2015b) maintains that “the successful whitewashing of [the colonial] past is manifest ... not merely                                 
in particular proscribed belief­sets but in the way  competing conceptual frameworks and their related                           
categories now appear odd , perhaps even bizarre, to us. It is hard for us even to grasp them because of                                       
the deep cognitive naturalization of Eurocentrism and whiteness in our outlook. The very space and time of                                 
the polity – what could be more fundamental? – are being challenged insofar as the nation­state seems the                                   
‘natural’ political unit, located in a sequential temporality of antiquity/medievalism/modernity, with modernity                       
marking the advent of moral egalitarianism in the West ... But alternative categorizations of both space and                                 
time are possible that would bring to cognitive salience the existence of  larger supra­national political                             
entities of domination and subordination , which are normatively characterized by the inequality of most of                             
the world’s population under ‘modern’ Western racial rule [emphases added].” (pp.222­223) To what extent                           
does the decolonial critique of mainstream Internet governance presented herein, which points to white                           
supremacy as a ‘large supra­national’ polity formation  transversally informing and inflecting                     
multistakeholder configurations (nation­statist, corporate, non­governmental etc.) of Internet governance,                 
appear ‘odd’, perhaps even ‘bizarre’? 
173  In this connection, I concur with Mills (2015b) who maintains that “the overcoming of past and present                                   
white ignorance would require a systematic excavation of the shaping by racial ideology and racial                             
liberalism of both past theory (the social sciences and humanities; the relevant natural sciences, such as                               
biology and physical anthropology) and practice (law, public policy, government), and an uncompromising                         




transnational network liberalism: “[1] communications globalization is, on net, an                   
overwhelmingly good thing for humanity ...Its benefits, however, accrue only if it is                         
subject to the discipline of end user choice, which creates a congruence between the costs                             
and benefits of the filtering and the entity doing the filtering” (p.18)  ; “[2] the threats of                               174
technical fragmentation are overblown. The Internet is not breaking apart. The network                       
effects and economic benefits generated by widespread connectivity — the sinews that                       
hold the Internet together — are powerful and growing” (p.18); “[3] the rhetoric of                           
fragmentation can be used to camouflage the more important issue, which is the                         
question of alignment, the perceived need to re-align control of communication with the                         
jurisdictional boundaries of national states ... [Hence, there is a need to consider] the                           
problem of network-state alignment” (pp.18-19); and “[4] there is a need to challenge] the                           
equation of free, open, globalized communications with the supremacy of the US                       
government. Given the dominance of US firms and the stated objectives of American                         
policy, it is, I admit, easy and tempting to view things that way. But that viewpoint is                                 
based on obsolete, state-centric assumptions. It fails to recognize the degree to which                         
cyberspace is creating its own polity with its own interests, one that is not conjoint with                               
the interests of specific states. Indeed, if all we can see in the struggles over Internet                               
governance is the question of which state comes out more powerful than its rivals, then                             
our mentality has advanced little from seventeenth-century mercantilism.” (p.19) On                   
this basis, Mueller (2017) maintains that “if national alignment is the problem [the                         
solution must be] a move away from national sovereignty and towards popular                       
sovereignty in cyberspace” (p.19), raising the question as to whether there can be “a                           
cyber-version of nationalism, an Internet nation so to speak, that forges its own political                           
identity and provides the impetus for transnational forms of Internet governance” (p.20)                     
 . 175
174  I suggest that the claim that globalized communications is an ‘overwhelming good for humanity’ is                               
largely rhetorical in nature and that its liberal (if not libertarian) framing obscures the fact that the Internet is                                     
embedded in a racialized modern/colonial world system, such racialized coloniality both informing and                         
manifesting itself through network effects, and that it is not a level playing field of ‘end users’, but rather an                                       
asymmetric terrain dominated by West­centrism and global white supremacy. 
175  But what is the nature (or constitution) of this populous (‘the people’), and what of prior asymmetries                                   
borne of persistent legacy system effects that inform and inflect this emergent network popular                           
sovereignty? Interestingly, Mueller (2017) recognizes the need to consider the differential composition of                         
‘the people’, citing the US Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information                     
Administration (NTIA) “transferring oversight of the IANA functions to ‘the people’ of the Internet, and                             
providing the institutional mechanisms through which any of those people with the awareness and capacity                             
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Yet if the above critique of liberalism as racialized is sound, where does this leave                             
Mueller’s proposal for aligning – and devolving – Internet governance matters to a global                           
‘net nation’? Mueller (2010) argues that transnational networked liberalism “moves                   
decisively away from  the dangerous, conflict-prone tendency of other ideologies to build                       
political institutions around linguistic, religious, and ethnic communities. Instead of                   
rigid, bounded communities that conceal domination with the pretence of homogeneity                     
and a ‘collective will,’ it offers governance of communication and information through                       
more flexible and shifting social aggregations [emphasis added]” (p.269); on his view,                       
“globalizing the capabilities of social democracy  without tempering it with liberalism ,                     
and without bringing into being a wide-ranging public sphere that transcends                     
territorially limited cultures and language communities could be  quite dangerous                   
[emphasis added]” (p.261). Accordingly, he insists that “there can be no  cyberliberty                       
without a political movement to define, defend, and institutionalize individual rights                     
and freedoms on a transnational scale [emphasis added].” (p.271) However, if Mills (2017)                         
is correct in arguing that  actual liberalism, both historically and in the contemporary                         
era, is racially-inflected  , it would appear that Mueller’s proposal for an Internet                       176
governance regulated by a post-Westphalian ‘net nation’ subscribing to ‘transnational                   177
to participate could construct the new order.” On his view, “the global multistakeholder community was, in                               
the end, any group  sufficiently mobilized around Internet governance issues to weigh in” (p.134), yet he                               
concedes that “of course, there were imbalances and biases in the composition of this community. There is                                 
no need to be naive or romantic about the construct ‘the people’ ... [However,] it does mean that the                                     
process was open to anyone and that those who did participate were  sufficiently inclusive of the affected                                 
stakeholders to make the output an acceptable basis for governing [emphases added].” (pp.134­135) I                           
would suggest that Mueller’s articulation in terms of groups sufficiently mobilized obscures, perhaps                         
unintentionally, the fact that openness to participation was determined by  ability to mobilize which is                             
arguably informed by legacy system effects vis­à­vis power; to paraphrase Orwell: “ Ideally all people are                             
participants;  actually , some people [can] participate more than others (and some might not be able to                               
participate at all).” In addition, it is unclear what criteria of ‘inclusive sufficiency’ is operative here since                                 
Mueller concedes that it was not determined by demographic factors: “It does not mean that the                               
geographic origins, ethnicities, languages, and religions of the involved population exactly matches their                         
distribution in the world population.” (p.135) Mueller refers to ‘affected stakeholders’, but given that                           
different stakeholders are affected differently depending on their body­political marking, geo­political                     
situatedness and alignment with power in the modern/colonial world system, I would suggest that this                             
points more to  differentiation  within ‘the people’ rather than their  identity as a ‘net­nation’. 
176  In short, what of the historical legacy situation informing an emergent ‘cyber nationalism’? And what if                                 
this cyber­nationalism turns out to function as a network­based mask for sedimented world systemic                           
identity formations operating in a diffuse transnational informational space? Once again, I want to suggest                             
that such a line of questioning should not be seen as belonging to the paranoid genre of ‘conspiracy                                   
theory’, but rather as  decolonially­prudent speculation informed by the historical experience of the past 500                             
years of colonialism, imperialism and Eurocentric racism endured by ‘the wretched of the earth’. 
177  I suggest that the hegemonic racial composition of this ‘net nation’ needs to be understood in relation to                                     
network effects preferentially favouring ‘early adopters’, ‘front runners’, ‘pioneers’ ( sic ) etc., and that the                           
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network liberalism’ is at best inappropriate for, and at worse stands in oppositional                         
relation to, an Internet governance in/for the Global South  . At a minimum, I suggest                           178




In order to understand how racialized coloniality informs and inflects Internet                     
governance vis-à-vis appeal to ‘network effects’, both in terms of possible ‘rhetorical                       
overplay’ as well as possible ‘strategic concealment’ , there is a need to clarify the                           179
structure – or rather,  topology – of the Internet (web and social media) and its                             
governance. According to Zapata Rioja (2014), “the Internet carries itself a                     
non-hierarchical, decentralized and distributed participation of users and developers”                 
while there are “points of centralized control and key gatekeepers in the Internet                         
governance field” (p.77). Drawing on the work of feminist cyborg-theorist Donna                     
Haraway, and using an STS-based analytical framework, Mathew (2016) appeals to the                       
notion of situated knowledges and contestation in order to present a similar view,                         
framing the Internet as a distributed and contested, rather than ‘flat’ and decentralised,                         
socio-technical space  . According to Mathew, while “the early Internet did appear                     180
decentralised to its users ... the experiences of apparent decentralisation and control are                         
following observation of Turner (2006) on the ‘countercultural’ roots of Silicon Valley cyber­culture is                           
particularly insightful in this connection: “Race relations echoed patterns found elsewhere in the                         
counterculture … what kind of world would this new [countercultural, cyber­cultural] elite build? To the                             
extent that the Whole Earth Catalog serves as a guide, it would be masculine, entrepreneurial,                             
well­educated, and white. It would celebrate systems theory and the power of technology to foster social                               
change. And  it would turn away from questions of gender, race, and class, and toward a rhetoric of                                   
individual and small­group empowerment [emphasis added].” (p.97) 
178  As stated previously, Mills (2017) suggests that liberalism is politically, economically and morally                           
irretrievable  unless radically transformed along ‘black radical’ lines thereby effecting redistribution (of                       
wealth, power, personal worth etc.); yet according to Mills (2015b) “a reconstructed and racially sanitized                             
past is crucial for the pre­emptive blocking of the question of the dependence of current white wealth and                                   
privilege, both nationally and globally, on the historic racial exploitation of the labour, land, and                             
techno­cultural contributions of people of colour.” (p.223) Once again, I want to suggest that it is unclear                                 
whether such a  transformed liberalism ultimately remains ‘liberal’ in orientation. 
179  In referring to ‘strategic concealment’, I should point out, once again, that this is not necessarily                                 
conscious or wilful, but rather quite possibly motivated and effected by the operation of tacit dispositional                               
logics that are of a social­psychological and ‘background’ nature. 
180  On his view, a “shift in perspective, from decentralised to distributed, is essential to understand the past                                   
and present Internet, and to imagine possible future Internets which preserve and support the public good.”                               
(p.1) Yet  what is ‘the public good’ and  who gets to define it? To what extent does this position invoke, albeit                                         




both constructed over an underlying infrastructure which was never decentralised, nor                     
designed with decentralisation as a goal.” Supporting his argument with an analysis of a                           
key technology of the Internet, viz. the BGP (Border Gateway Protocol)  , Mathew                       181
maintains that “the Internet is better conceived of as a distributed system – rather than a                               
decentralised system – with varied centres and concentrations of power in its                       
construction [and that]  decentralisation was not a design goal , nor the actual outcome, in                           
the creation and subsequent operation of BGP, and by extension, of the Internet                         
[emphasis added].” (p.2) Mathew’s argument is important in terms of thinking about the                         
topology of the Internet, viz. as distributed rather than decentralized, and is consistent                         182
with empirical findings demonstrating that the Internet is a scale-free network (as are                         
the web and some social media networks) (Barabási and Bonabeau 2003) (Barabási 2003)                         
(Guadamuz 2011)  . Mathew “take[s] topology as a central problem in the analysis of                         183
governance, to understand how coordination, collaboration, and power relationships                 
function through topological positions and structures”; more specifically, “how the                   
topological forms of Internet infrastructure  interact with the practices and social                     
formations involved in operating Internet infrastructure ; and how these interactions                   
structure the governance of Internet infrastructure [emphasis added].” Crucially, on his                     
view, “the power and authority required to engage in governance  flow from topology                         
[emphasis added]” (p.4), yet “the structure of the networks in which infrastructure is                         
deployed ... interact with the development of practices, standards and political economy                       
of infrastructure.” (p.4) In this connection, Mathew has drawn attention to “changing                       
forms of governance across different periods in the history of the Internet, through                         
181  Mathew (2016) describes three phases in “the evolution of the relationships between technological form,                             
control and topology which were required to govern Internet routing”, viz. (1) centralised control, (2)                             
hierarchical control, and (3) poly­centric control (pp.2­3). 
182  ‘ Distributed’ should be understood here in the ostensibly paradoxical sense of ‘decentralised                         
centralization’, and not in the sense that Baran used this term in his seminal 1962 paper, “On Distributed                                   
Communications Networks” (RAND Corporation Papers, Document P­2626), viz. in contrast to centralised                       
and decentralised. 
183  According to Barabási and Bonabeau (2003), “many networks [including the web] are dominated by a                               
relatively small number of nodes that are connected to many other sites. Networks containing such                             
important nodes, or hubs, tend to be what we call ‘scale­free,’ in the sense that some hubs have a                                     
seemingly unlimited number of links and no node is typical of the others.” (p.52) Crucially, they maintain                                 
that while random networks are ‘deeply democratic’ in that “most nodes will have approximately the same                               
number of links.” (p.52), scale­free networks follow a power­law distribution: “In contrast to the democratic                             
distribution of links seen in random networks, power laws describe systems in which a few hubs ...                                 
dominate.” (p.53) However, it is not just the web and social networks that are scale­free, but the physical                                   




distinct articulations of technological form, control and topology.” (p.3) While                   
concurring with the importance of adopting a  historical approach to the political                       
economy of infrastructure (and beyond to higher layer network phenomena including                     
those associated with the web and social media), I want to suggest, on the basis of earlier                                 
arguments, the need to consider a geographically wider and historically  longer durée                       
historical background to the one engaged by Mathew and the role of ideological                         
dispositions – specifically, coloniality and the ‘legacy system’ effects of racialized                     
liberalism – informing practices vis-à-vis emergent network topology and its                   
relationship to prior extant world systemic network formations  . In this connection,                     184
Franklin (2011) has argued that “Internet governance, despite its being based on a                         
functional form of geographical distribution rather than central location … is                     
nonetheless culturally and geopolitically concentrated.” (p.14) While concurring with                 
this assessment, I want to suggest that this concentration needs to be unpacked in terms                             
of how racialized coloniality  diachronically connects different network formations, and                   
how network effects involving preferential attachment mobilize liberal dispositions that                   
are racially inflected. 
For example, Mueller (2017) both demonstrates an awareness of and makes explicit                       
reference to the importance of network effects in arguing against the possibility of                         
Internet fragmentation. On his view, “network benefits exist when the value of a product                           
to its users increases as other users adopt the  same system or service ... Once a certain                                 
threshold of other users is attained, however, there will be enough benefit to keep users                             
there – and to start attracting others ... [This] process of achieving critical mass is                             
path-dependent ... A model of network growth will exhibit multiple equilibria, depending                       
on who joins  and in what sequence [emphasis added].” (pp.44-46) What is not engaged                           
here, despite the tacit appeal to temporality in acknowledging the importance of                       
‘sequence’, path-dependency and ‘critical mass’, is any consideration of the possibility of                       
diachronic / historical ‘entanglement’ of such network effects with prior extant network                       
formations  . While recognizing the importance of preferential attachment and the                   185
184  While Mathew (2014, p.20) is cognizant of the importance of the ‘race factor’ vis­à­vis thinking about                                 
infrastructure, he does not engage with this issue at length, nor along critical race theoretical and/or                               
decolonial lines – that is, in relation to colonial modernity as a racialized global phenomenon of long durée. 
185  In this connection, consider the following important remark made by Lake and Wong (2007): “There is,                                 
we suspect, an important “life cycle” in networks, missed by those who study only well­developed or                               
already successful networks. Self­enforcing networks based on reciprocity may well reflect  earlier , more                         
power­based structures and, in crisis, may manifest the power that remains latent in central nodes                             
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power laws operative in scale-free networks resulting in a ‘rich get richer’ situation                         
(Barabási and Bonabeau 2003), Mueller frames this effect in economistic terms, thereby                       
failing to situate this phenomenon in relation to the legacy system effects of colonialism                           
– that is, the racialized structural logics of coloniality informing and inflecting social                         
networks – which persist into the postcolonial era  . Consider, in this regard,                       186
preferential attachment. How might this be informed in the context of social networks? I                           
would suggest that the deferential standing afforded those situated in the core of the                           
world system and racialized as white might count as factors. I further suggest that this                             
point is of crucial significance in thinking about the role of long durée historical factors                             
and the identity of socio-political actors in network formation: insofar as the Internet                         
was a Cold War technology emerging in the global context of a racialized                         
modern/colonial world system and the local context of a racial-liberal state – the US – in                               
which white (male) individuals, institutions and collectives were ‘front-runners’ /                   
pioneers / ‘frontier colonists’ (Sardar 1996) in an emerging constructed ‘cyberspace’,                     
power-laws and the ‘rich get richer’ phenomenon associated with preferential                   
attachment occurred  . In this sense, the Internet and subsequently the web and social                         187
media – all of which were and continue to be globally-dominated by white (male)                           
front-runners who ‘got in front’ by virtue of the legacy system effects of colonialism and                             
[emphasis added].” (p.11) On their view, there is a need to consider a political model “of both network                                   
creation and diffusion ... focus[ing] on the widespread activation of a particular set of beliefs with differential                                 
costs and benefits from within a larger universe of existing beliefs that, in turn, creates a network where                                   
none previously existed.” (p.14) What is missing here, I aver, is consideration of how a prior extant                                 
scale­free network might inform the scale­free structure of a posterior emerging network, although I                           
concede that this might be implicit in Lake and Wong’s reference to the role of “earlier, more power­based                                   
structures” in relation to network life­cycles. Put simply, I want to suggest that the emergence of the                                 
Internet needs to be understood as a sociotechnical ‘iteration’ within the long durée ‘programmatic’                           
onto­logic of racialized modern/colonial domination. 
186  In short, no attempt is made to engage with  constitutive (generative, productive) historical relations                             
between different network formations, nor with racial hegemony as a factor in the structuring of such                               
relations vis­à­vis network effects. 
187  In this connection, Lake and Wong (2007) observe that “agenda­setting power is particularly crucial –                               
and, in fact, most clearly evident – at the network  formation stage and may become less overt                                 
subsequently as it attains the status of a  norm within a  stable network ... both power and norms are                                     
emergent properties of networks. They are not given by external forces, but arise from the self­interest and                                 
practice of the members of the networks themselves.” (p.17) In this connection, consider DeNardis’ (2014)                             
liberal  celebratory invocation of network effects, viz. “many coordinating efforts have produced the  overall                           
salutary network effects of interoperability, economic competition and innovation, relative security, and                       
freedom of expression [emphasis added].” (p.24) On her view, “successful global Internet governance                         




white supremacy which involved holding ‘The Rest’ back – should be seen as                         188
phenomena that emerge through processes ‘entangled’ with a tacit yet embedded                     
racialized colonial logic  ; in this connection, Guadamuz (2017) has recently argued for                       189
the need to consider network effects in relation to the phenomenon of ‘digital                         
colonialism’  . 190
188  The phenomenon referred to by dependency­theorists as ‘the development of underdevelopment’. 
189  Lake and Wong (2009) argue that political power can be an emergent property of networks, found most                                   
likely in scale­free structures; further, that central (or more connected) nodes can influence a network                             
directly or indirectly and thereby shape the ends towards which the nodes collectively move: “"Both                             
distributed and small world networks possess little potential for power differentials, given the redundancy of                             
connections and the equitable distribution of links in both types of structures. Highly connected nodes in                               
scale­free networks, on the other hand, are likely to be the most powerful. Because of their critical role and                                     
the likely dissolution of the network should they be eliminated, central nodes can exploit the value created                                 
by the network to gain influence over other members. When distributional conflicts arise, these hubs are                               
more likely to be able to impose their preferences on others. More directly, they will be able to move the                                       
network in directions they prefer and extract a relatively greater share of the network’s value. The                               
differential power of nodes emerges from the pattern of interconnections within the network. Central nodes                             
can also capitalize on that “structural” power by making the network more efficient and valuable to its                                 
members, further enhancing the power of the central node. The emergence of power within networks is a                                 
dynamic and self­reinforcing process.” (p.10) Crucially, however, they maintain that “over time, the power                           
of [a] central node may appear to recede. Once the innovation has diffused broadly, and a network is                                   
created around selected principles, the network appears to become self­sustaining. As the network                         
matures, the original innovation is ‘normalized’ such that nodes within the network can barely imagine that                               
it could have been otherwise. Nonetheless, even though it is seldom made manifest, the power of the                                 
central node still resides in the background and, indeed, grows ever stronger with the success of the                                 
network.” (p.16) I would suggest this applies to the longe durée ‘diffusion’ of white supremacy – and the                                   
desirability of (proximity to) whiteness – as a global system in its various political and economic                               
incarnations including the Westphalian interstate system and the neoliberal economics associated with                       
globalization. 
190  Guadamuz (2017) maintains that “Western digital dominance ... has various explanations. The Internet                           
itself started as a US military research network, so US­based services and developers had a starting                               
advantage. For a large period of time, Internet governance relied on US­centric ICANN (which has since                               
undergone internationalisation efforts). Furthermore, early venture capitalists invested mostly in US                     
companies, and this dominance carried forward. Network theory teaches that early advantages are often                           
difficult to overcome, and the network favours winner­takes­all from an architectural perspective.                       
Furthermore, the US was able to convert this early advantage in expertise and funding into large                               
corporations. Finally, potential competitors have been more inward looking, and not intent on global                           
dominance. China has developed hugely successful companies like JD, Tencent, Baidu, and Alibaba which                           
rival US counterparts in size, but these are mostly directed towards the internal market. The same                               
happens with other successful companies such as Flipkart (India), B2W (Latin America), and Odigeo                           
(Europe). The result is a US­centric Internet from the perspective of infrastructure and content. From the                               
infrastructure level, the largest hosting, domain name, storage and content delivery networks are US                           
companies. In content, Google and Facebook stand alone in their dominance of what people see and read                                 
around the world. The problem is that the content dominance becomes a self­fulfilling prophecy, as these                               
companies use their already strong dominant position to maintain the market dominance in what is often                               
called the ‘rich­get­richer’ effect. Newer content providers in developing countries are competing with                         
companies that have considerable resources, infrastructure, and consumer recognition.” From a decolonial                       
perspective, I would suggest that his analysis falls short in terms of its rather truncated history, and failure                                   
to situate the military origins of the Internet against the backdrop of an attempt to maintain Western                                 
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Mueller also maintains that “after nearly all users have converged on a single network,                           
inertia or  lock-in tends to set in ... Inertia is created by the participants’ general                             
unwillingness to give up the network benefits achieved once everyone else has converged                         
on a common platform. Just as a user’s decision to join the network was dependent upon                               
the decision of others to also join, so a user’s decision to abandon a network for an                                 
incompatible alternative will be strongly affected by the level of network benefits he                         
might have to sacrifice by moving to a new network.” (p.47) Crucially, in the context of                               
discussing the issue of ‘alignment’, Mueller maintains, against a Westphalian-centric                   
backdrop informed by a commitment to political and economic liberalism, that a state’s                         
“limit[ing] the cross-border movement of … data [creates] an island that destroys the                         
network effects and efficiencies of the global Internet.” (p.93) Here we ostensibly find a                           
prizing of network effects and Internet efficiency in and of themselves. Yet what if these                             
are subjected to other, overriding concerns? I would suggest that a tacit ‘Eurocentric                         
universal’ (Wallerstein 2006) narrative of technological progress and free-market                 
capitalism under neoliberalism is at work here, along with a certain ‘rhetorical overplay’                         
in the appeal to ‘inertia’ that, intentionally or otherwise, results in deterring and                         
deferring decolonizing efforts that might be enacted by non-Western governments  . 191
Finally, attention should be drawn to the fact that network effects are ‘entangled’ with, if                             
not generative of, the global digital divide, the latter of which both Mueller (2017) and                             
DeNardis (2014) have argued should not be seen as an Internet governance issue as                           
shown earlier. Crucially, according to a 2017 GCI (Global Connectivity Index) Report                       
hegemony and (white) world supremacy in the Cold War context following WW2. Thus, while Guadamuz                             
points to the relationship between network effects and digital colonialism, he fails to relate both to the long                                   
durée history of colonialism, the core­periphery network that is the modern/colonial world system, and how                             
persistent colonial logics operative in prior extant networks have contributed to the emergence of the                             
Internet itself. In short, no attempt is made to engage with the ‘iterative’ racialized historical relationship                               
between network formations. 
191  I would suggest that this occurs through a tacit depoliticisation involving appeal to network effects as                                 
‘natural’ phenomena; in this connection it is important to note that according to Barabási and Bonabeau                               
(2003), “knowledge of a network's general topology is  just part of the story in understanding the overall                                 
characteristics and behaviour of such systems.” (p.59). Regarding the issue of ‘naturalization’ of network                           
phenomena, Sholle (2002) maintains that “the cultural and political struggles that set in place the functions                               
of ... new media have been to a large extent settled, and these cultural and political formations are now                                     
embedded in these technologies; they form the ‘unconscious’ of the new technology which tends to                             
become invisible. As a result, the new media have taken up the appearance of nature.” (p.14) While                                 
concurring that such technologies have become sedimented, I draw attention to Sholle’s reference to                           
‘political struggle’ and the ‘appearance of nature’ in order to point to the  persistent  contingency of the                                 




(Huawei 2017), due to network effects, the digital divide has become “a digital chasm”.                           
The report goes on to state that 2017 “could conveniently be characterized as a meeting                             
of ‘digitally-developed and digitally-developing’ nations – an evolution from the ‘digital                     
have and have-nots’ of previous years.” (p.2)  192
In the following, penultimate section, I present an extended decolonial reflection on                       
NWICO and WSIS with a view to drawing attention to power-relational shifts in Internet                           
governance discourse that resulted in deferral of the decolonization project preparatory                     
to concluding in the final section with some brief recommendations about how to  resume                           
and proceed with decolonizing Internet governance, targeting the issue of alignment and                       
its ‘entanglement’ with concerns about a possible future ‘fragmentation’ of the Internet. 
 
8. ‘From NWICO to WSIS’: Decolonial Reflections  193
During the 1960s and 1970s, “Southern countries called for a New International                       
Economic Order (NIEO) to end economic imperialism and a New World Information and                         
Communication Order (NWICO) to eliminate cultural colonialism” in order “to create a                       
balanced flow of information and cultural resources in the world and … be economically                           
and culturally self-reliant. They placed their demands at UN forums, mainly UNESCO                       
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). However, they could not achieve                     
the goals.” (Abu Buiyan 2008, pp.110-111) According to Carlsson (2005), “the new                       
international information order rested on four cornerstones, the ‘four Ds’:                   
democratization of the flows of information between countries;  decolonialization , i.e.                   
self-determination, national independence and cultural identity;  demonopolization , i.e.               
setting limits on the activities of transnational communications companies; and                   
development , i.e. national communication policy, strengthening of infrastructure,               
192  The report further states that: “a three­year observation of the GCI data reveals a widening S­curve,                                 
indicating deepening inequality. The numbers tell the story: In GCI 2017, Frontrunners pulled far ahead,                             
improving their GCI scores by 4.7 points, and Adopters by 4.5 points. But the Starters lagged farther                                 
behind, improving their GCI score on average by only 2.4 points. We are witnessing an ICT version of                                   
sociology’s ‘Matthew Effect,’ where the ‘rich get richer and the poor get poorer’  based on accumulated                               
advantage over time . Policy makers in the Adopters, and especially in the Starters, must consider the                               
growing inequality as it will have continued consequences on their ability to compete and sustain economic                               
growth. The Frontrunners’  growing advantage is based on a head start in ICT Infrastructure deployment as                               
well as expertise in five core technologies: Broadband, Datacenters, Cloud, Big Data and IoT. The GCI                               
data show that investment in ICT Infrastructure initiates a chain reaction leading to Digital Transformation,                             
with Cloud as a catalyst for that reaction [emphases added].” (pp.3­4) 




journalism education, and regional cooperation.” (p.197) In this connection, McPhail                   
(2014) presents a slightly more nuanced analysis of NWICO, drawing attention to the                         
racialized factor associated with colonialism: “ Colonial domination ,  neocolonialism ,               
racial discrimination , apartheid, media images, cultural imperialism, chronic               
imbalances, Western hegemony, and violations of human rights were all subject to                       
severe criticism [emphasis added].” However, he maintains that “the anti-colonial                   194
rhetoric of the [proposed] new order was harsh [and] although the goals of the new order                               
were lofty, its real objective was to  shift international power from Western core nations to                             
a loose coalition of peripheral regions , Arab OPEC regions, non-aligned nations, and                       
socialist countries (namely, the USSR). The next goal was to effect a change in                           
sociocultural priorities under the protection or guidance of NWICO [emphases added].”                     
(p.54) Yet  was this the case? Was the ‘real objective’ of NWICO about shifting power                             
relations from ‘the West’ to ‘the Rest’, or was it (merely) about decentering the former in                               
order to create a polycentric world order? Notwithstanding the answer to that question,                         
it is important to appreciate that NWICO was ultimately abandoned on account of                         
Western pressures which included the withdrawal of substantial financing to UNESCO,                     
the original sponsor of NWICO  . According to Carlsson (2005), “the efforts of third                         195
world countries to bring about thoroughgoing reform of the information and                     
communication order within the framework of UNESCO, the principal norm-setting                   
international forum in this area, failed. A political idea had to be sacrificed for the sake                               
of development assistance.” (p.203) Crucially, in this connection she maintains that                     
during the 1980s “the West put development and aid issues squarely on the agenda and                             
managed to  turn the focus away from their own roles and onto conditions in the third                               
world countries. The international dimension was diluted, as it had been in the MacBride                           
Commission’s work. In this we can perceive a crossroads for UNESCO on the horizon, a                             
194  McPhail (2014) insists that “historically, the debate [on NWICO] was about aspects of electronic                             
colonialism  that the core nations did not want to hear about, deal with, or come to terms with. (p.62) 
195  Western governments and their media openly opposed NWICO. Carlsson (2005) maintains that                         
UNESCO was “criticized for inefficiency and for having become ‘politicized’.  The prominence and influence                           
of third world countries in UNESCO in the early 1980s, a result of Director­General M’Bow’s policies,  was a                                   
source of constant irritation [emphasis added].” (p.203) According to McPhail (2014), on their view – and it                                 
is a view, I argue, that continues to be upheld by Internet governance theorists such as DeNardis (2016)                                   
and Mueller (2010, 2017) – “only an open and free flow of information is viewed as being fully consistent                                     
with the goals of a truly free [society].” However, consistent with the position argued herein, McPhail states                                 




point at which the organization would have to choose between continued work on a new                             
information order and a more decided focus on development and aid issues [emphasis                         
added].” (p.201) From a decolonial perspective, I want to suggest that this was, in fact, a                               196
strategic move on the part of ‘the West’, diverting the Global South from focus on NWICO                               
in order for the Global North to consolidate its hegemony in the next ‘iterative phase’                             
within a (racialized) developmentalist trajectory – the transition to a global information                       
order. In this connection, it is imperative to consider the ‘entangled’ histories of the shift                             
from economic liberalism to neoliberalism commencing in the 1980s with the shift in                         197
use of the Internet as a purportedly libertarian communications medium originally built                       
by researchers to a vehicle for commercial exploitation  . 198
196  According to Carlsson (2005), “the [MacBride] Commission’s thinking alternated between the                       
modernization and dependency paradigms; the concept of neocolonialism confronted decolonialization.                   
But, above all, the recommendations suggested a third, alternative concept of development.” (p.212) While                           
correct, Carlsson appears oblivious to the various critiques of dependency theory vis­à­vis the                         
decolonization project mounted by contemporary decolonial scholars described earlier, yet appears to                       
concede the link between modernity/coloniality and development, viz. “even if the points of departure and                             
terms of reference used today are quite different from those [articulated in the proposal of a NWICO] in the                                     
1970s, ‘development’ is still bound up with the modernist project of the Western world” (p.213). 
197  See Bessis (2001) for a useful account of the shift from economic liberalism to neoliberal ‘free­trade’                                 
globalization commencing in the 1980s in the context of a long durée history focusing on the triumph of                                   
‘Western supremacy’. Bessis’ account is relevant in the context of the decolonial reading of the                             
modern/world system presented herein insofar as it engages with a range of issues that need to be taken                                   
into consideration when thinking through the nature of the present including the conquest of the Americas,                               
the Trans­Atlantic slave trade, the growth of ‘scientific’ racism, imperialism and the scramble for Africa,                             
‘The White Man’s burden’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’, decolonization and the rise of ‘The West’, the ideology of                                 
development, and structural adjustment programmes associated with the IMF and World Bank. Crucially,                         
according to Milanovic (2005, p.50), during the period 1960­1978, the mean unweighted income of ‘the                             
Rest’ relative to ‘the West’ increased; this corresponded to the period following the anti­colonial                           
independence struggles when economic liberalism and development were on the agenda. However, during                         
the period 1978­2000, the mean unweighted income of ‘the Rest’ relative to ‘the West’ decreased. This                               
corresponds to the onset of neoliberalism and globalization, a period in which the Internet transformed into                               
a communications for commerce (or economic exploitation) medium driven by West­centric capitalism. 
198  Carlsson (2005) maintains that “the development of innovative information technologies and the ongoing                           
processes of deregulation and concentration of ownership have spurred the pace of globalization.” (p.204)                           
According to Clark (2016), “there is one set of actors that has faded from view: the federally funded                                   
research community that designed and built the Internet. From one point of view, this trajectory is proper:                                 
they did their job, the commercial world has taken over, and the Internet is now an engine of economic                                     
innovation.” (p.16) I want to argue for reinterpreting this somewhat  apolitical techno­centric narrative in                           
terms of the ‘operational logic’ of colonialism, viz.  military intervention as facilitating precursor to/for                           
commercial exploitation. While it might be argued that the  
Internet was not  imposed on the periphery through military intervention, this argument fails  
to appreciate the  broader Cold War context within which the Internet emerged as described earlier, and the                                 
possibility that ‘the net’ (web, cyberspace) was opened up as a ‘frontier’ from a US­dominated core that                                 




Yet the issue of transitioning to a more equitable information order remained on the                           
agenda. In this connection, the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was a                           199
two-phase United Nations-sponsored summit on information, communication and, in                 
broad terms, the information society that took place in 2003 in Geneva and in 2005 in                               
Tunis. One of its chief aims was to bridge the global digital divide separating rich                             
countries from poor countries by spreading access to the Internet in the developing                         
world  . According to Abu Bhuiyan (2014) the WSIS should be seen as “a triumph of                             200
neoliberalism in global communication policymaking, as it did not make any efforts to                         
critique the existing neoliberal political and economic environment within which                   
decisions about ICTs are made” (p.3), the focus of WSIS being inclusion (into the                           201
neoliberal order) and development as a means by which to bridge the digital divide  .                           202
Carlsson (2005) maintains that “among the fundamental ideas behind the WSIS is an                         
ambition to create a more inclusive Information Society and to bridge the digital divide                           
in a North-South perspective.” (p.213) However, McLaughlin and Pickard (2005) maintain                     
that “in allegedly offering a venue in which all stakeholders were welcomed, the WSIS                           
process would unfold in such a way that, with few exceptions,  everyone would remain in                             
199  According to Abu Bhuiyan (2014), “the WSIS in global communication [is] the third attempt of the UN                                   
system to deal with communication. The other two events [being] the codification of the Universal                             
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and the movement for a New World Information and                               
Communication Order (NWICO) which took place throughout the 1970s.” (p.2) 
200  In its Declaration of Principles, ‘Building the Information Society: A Global Challenge in the New                               
Millennium’, the following statement was issued: “We, the representatives of the peoples of the world,                             
assembled in Geneva from 10­12 December 2003 for the first phase of the World Summit on the                                 
Information Society, declare our common desire and commitment to build a people­centred, inclusive and                           
development­oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and share                     
information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in                           
promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life, premised on the purposes and                             
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration                               
of Human Rights.” From a decolonial and critical race theoretical perspective, the demand for reparations                             
for the persistent legacy effects of colonialism, not to mention the Trans­Atlantic slave trade and its role in                                   
‘kickstarting’ the Industrial Revolution, is notable for its absence. 
201  McLaughlin and Pickard (2005) concur with this view, seeing the WSIS as a manifestation of the                                 
neo­corporate mode of governance at the global level. On their view, “the price for inclusion ... has been                                   
the erosion of an oppositional civil society” and ‘corporatist’ – that is, stable, co­operative integration –                               
adoption of / assimilation into neoliberalism (p.357). However, like Abu Bhuiyan, McLaughlin and Pickard                           
frame the issue in economistic terms, thereby occluding the operation of racialized colonial logics.  
202  Regarding this divide, Carlsson (2005) maintains that “the relationships between the wealthy countries                           
and the poor countries of the world that the MacBride Commission described at the end of the 1970s still                                     
seem to prevail, essentially unchanged, albeit some of the terminology is new. Today we speak of ‘the                                 
digital divide’ which ... actually consists of several ‘divides’:  a technological divide ...  a content divide ...  a                                   
gender divide ... and  a commercial divide .” (pp.204­205) Once again, I would suggest that what is omitted                                 




their place [emphasis added]” (p.367); on their view, “pluralistic approaches [such as                       
multistakeholderism] eventually corrode into the marginalization of groups whose aims                   
do not coincide with the demands of the neoliberal economic imperative.” (p.368) Yet if                           
the tacitly racialized logic of development remains unexplored and uncontested, to what                       
extent is the digital divide  bridgeable given the ‘iterative’ and relational nature of both                           
development and the divide? Insofar as the WSIS agenda is tied to Millennium                         
Development goals etc., I want to contest more mainstream readings of the ‘failure’ of                           
the development project and argue instead that development has been  successful for ‘the                         
North’ if and when understood as a means by which to retrench hegemony under                           
contestation  . Insofar as multi-stakeholder co-option – framed somewhat               203
economistically along Eurocentric lines by McLaughlin and Pickard (2005) as                   
‘neo-corporatism’ in the service of neo-liberalism – and an ongoing commitment to the                         
development paradigm continue to inform Global South engagements with Internet                   
governance, I want to suggest that such stances will continue to reproduce asymmetric                         
power relationships  ; in this connection, consider that the discussion of Internet                     204
governance issues reported in the WSIS Forum 2017 Outcome Document (WSIS 2017) is                         
framed in terms of multistakeholderism, ICT4D and sustainable development, with no                     
reference to the persistent structural legacy effects of colonialism – that is, coloniality –                           
in the proceedings  . 205
203  According to Padavani and Nordenstreng (2005), “information systems, communication gaps,                     
development divides and the role and responsibilities of national and international actors have been                           
keywords in both processes [i.e. articulation of a NWICO in 1976 and the WSIS in 2005]. Yet it has been                                       
surprising to notice how the WSIS developed in the absence of any historical perspective. The present                               
communication context, with its globalizing dynamics, trends towards an ‘informational paradigm’ and                       
emerging transnational actors, is profoundly different from that of the 1970s. Yet most of the developments                               
we have witnessed in recent years find their roots in technological, societal and political changes that can                                 
be traced back to the time when proposals for a NWICO were debated." Crucially, they go on to assert that                                       
"this ‘historical gap’ is a major constraint ...  It is not just an innocent neglect but a deliberate omission . In                                       
any case, lack of historical depth in facing contemporary communication challenges reflects a dubious                           
tendency to understand such challenges as novelties on the world scene, inviting public institutions to                             
respond with a short­sighted political approach … by looking at the political dimension of international                             
debates ... we can better understand similarities and differences in the contexts within which issues have                               
been and are debated. We can identify  the continuity in problematic aspects of communication as a central                                 
element in societal organization . And we can identify  specific interests and power relations that underline                             
contemporary priorities in the shaping of policies [emphases added]." (p.265) I want to suggest that                             
‘iterativity’ in the sense of discursive re­articulation of racialized onto­logics should be understood as at                             
work here. 
204  On this point, see Sachs (2010, pp.1­5). 
205  It is interesting to note that no mention of the legacy system effects of colonialism, not to mention the                                       
necessity for compensation / reparations in respect thereof, appears in the NETmundial Multistakeholder                         
Statement (NETmundial 2014). In this connection, Zapata Rioja (2014) argues that “the innovations in the                             
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Padavani and Nordenstreng (2005) maintain that “WSIS [was] predominantly built on an                       
information technology approach, and this is naturally too narrow and shallow for any                         
serious analysis. NWICO was quite the opposite, with predominantly a political approach.                       
However ... we should not reduce the issues to either politics or technology but aim for a                                 
balanced analytical approach where politics and technology have their proper place                     
along with other relevant factors … too much politicization tends to both reduce critical                           
understanding and hamper practical action. The NWICO story shows that a promising                       
beginning may turn into a fruitless political shadow play which effectively blocks even                         
small reforms.” (pp.268-270) Regarding the point about ‘relevant factors’, as I have                       
attempted to argue herein, these need to include those that operate  transversally , both                         
geographically and historically, such as racialized colonialism; on the matter of                     
‘over-politicization’, I would suggest, to the contrary, that ‘under-politicization’ – or                     
rather, non-disclosure of that which is  already politicized – and a focus on  reform rather                             
than  reparations will not provide the necessary orientation to effect the decolonization                       
of Internet governance .  206
According to McPhail (2014), “the peripheral nations still cling to NWICO in the face of                             
greater core nation media pressure to adopt Western philosophies, products, and                     
practices ... Yet for the most part NWICO is a dead issue.” (pp.62-63) Can that which is                                 207
ostensibly ‘dead’ be brought back to life? Interestingly, McPhail appears to concede such                         
a possibility and consistent with this position, I argue for the need to forge a                             208
manners of participation of NETmundial, that is a broader and inclusive MSM [Multi­Stakeholder Model],                           
do not solve the power differences when it comes to the struggles to govern the Internet at the global level.                                       
Indeed, the São Paulo statement displays its weakness because despite its innovations, the core of the                               
document was much influenced by the holders of central Internet governance apparatus, that is, the US                               
government through NTIA, ICANN and the 1NET institutions.” (p.84) 
206  Going further, and building on a line of critique initiated by Andrejevic (2013) vis­á­vis postcolonial and                                 
post­structuralist tendencies towards localism as blocking (deterring, deferring) more structuralist and                     
globalist analyses and calls for transformation, albeit ‘extended’ to incorporate critical race theoretical and                           
decolonial concerns, I should like to suggest that such ‘small reforms’ should be viewed as obfuscatory,                               
albeit unintentionally. 
207  Consider, in this regard, the following remarks from Mustapha Masmoudi, a NWICO actor: “The                             
challenges of the past are still with us. Nowadays, the global flow of information is neither freer nor more                                     
balanced ... The tendency towards monopolistic Internet governance has not decreased, while the digital                           
divide is growing more acute. The reflections about the New World Information and Communication Order                             
certainly inspired the drafters of the WSIS resolutions. According to the ICSCP report, this new order was                                 
but a step in a long journey, aiming at establishing new bases of communication in all societies and                                   
between all peoples. This accounts for the renewed questioning of the current world order by South                               
participants at the Summit.” (Masmoudi 2012, p.28) 
208  In this connection, McPhail (2014) states that “despite the fact that some proponents still champion this                                 
vision, many believe that NWICO can no longer be taken seriously. Even UNESCO, where much of the                                 
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‘post-NWICO’ – or ‘NWICO 2.0’ – agenda along post-economistic and                   
post-developmentalist lines consistent with the broader decolonial project – a project                     
that was forestalled following decolonization and formal independence in the 1960s. 
 
9. Concluding Decolonial Recommendations 
McLaughlin and Pickard (2005) maintain that “the ‘information society’ is a label                       
suggesting a brave new world marked by new dynamics and radical breaks with past                           
relations – an ideological assumption connected to earlier post-industrial and neoliberal                     
rhetorics that privilege easily commodified information over communication processes                 
... At a time when it is not practicable for governments to de-link from neoliberal                             
globalization, visions based in technocratic and market-led approaches to development                   
arrive packaged in the language of emancipation.” (p.366) While broadly concurring                     
with their analysis, I want to problematize their rather economistic (that is, class-based)                         
interpretation of ‘de-linking’, which goes back to Marxist economist Samir Amin, and                       
consider alternative understandings of de-linking in relation to a topical issue within                       
Internet governance discourse, viz. concerns over possible Internet ‘fragmentation’ due                   
to increased statist action by non-Western governments – specifically, China, but also                       
Russia and to a lesser extent Iran – as expressed by DeNardis (2015, 2016) and others.                               
While some commentators such as Mueller (2017) are dismissive of such concerns on the                           
grounds that network effects make  technical fragmentation almost impossible and that                     
the ‘real’ problem is (statist)  alignment , I want to suggest that such assertions are                           
perhaps most usefully understood as rhetorical moves resulting in deferral of the                       
decolonial project , that the issue of fragmentation is far from settled, and that it is                             209
productive to think about the issue in terms of a  decolonial conceptualization of                         
‘de-linking’  . For Mignolo (2010b) this means engaging with a ‘border thinking’ that                       210
debate took place, has abandoned it.  Yet NWICO may be born again because of the deep divisions which                                   
emerged from the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) ... NWICO’s ultimate goal was a                               
restructured system of media and telecommunication priorities in order for LDCs to obtain greater influence                             
over their media, information, economic, cultural, and political systems.  For LDCs, or peripheral nations,                           
the current world communication system is an outgrowth of prior colonial patterns reflecting commercial                           
and market imperatives. NWICO was promoted as a way to remove this vestige of colonial control                               
[emphasis added].” (p.9) 
209  On this point, I again refer the reader to Farrell’s (1995) discussion of the possibility of rhetoric as                                     
intentional (in the sense of ‘directed’) yet unconscious / not wilful. 
210  Mueller (2010) contrasts the ‘cyberimperialism' of those committed to nationalist hierarchical control                         
“who would globalize governance through the extraterritorial application of one state’s laws and power”                           
(p.258) with denationalised network “economic and social liberalism” (p.259). However, I would suggest                         
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leads to a “de-colonial epistemic shift [that] brings to the foreground other                       
epistemologies, other principles of knowledge and understanding and, consequently,                 
other economy, other politics, other ethics” (p.307) By way of a decolonial                       
recommendation, I want to suggest taking seriously a de-linking extended from the                       
epistemological realm into ontological terrain – more specifically the socio-material                   
space of the Internet  . More concretely, it might be  necessary to oppose a commitment                           211
to Internet ‘universality’ and ‘openness’ in favour of statist alignment as a temporary                         
tactical maneuver within a strategic decolonial ‘horizon’. Following Mignolo                 
(López-Calvo 2016a, 2016b), I should like to suggest that moves by non-Western                       
nation-states to exert local governmental control over the Internet – perhaps even its                         
limited ‘fragmentation’ – might better be understood as  de-Westernizing ‘decentering’                   212
this framing in terms of the opposition between a single ‘cyberimperial’ state and a transnational liberal                               
network obscures the possibility of a collection of states creating a transnational network bloc opposed to                               
the continued operation of racialized liberalism. 
211  I would suggest that such an extension is fully consistent with the aforementioned decolonial conception                               
of delinking and might even be latent within it insofar as Mignolo (2010b) states that “if delinking means to                                     
change the terms of the conversation, and above all, of the hegemonic ideas of what knowledge and                                 
understanding are and, consequently, what economy and politics, ethics and philosophy,  technology and                         
the organization of society are and should be, it is necessary to fracture the  hegemony of knowledge and                                   
understanding that have been ruled, since the  fifteenth century and through the modern/colonial world by                             
what I conceive here as the theo­logical and the ego­logical politics of knowledge and understanding                             
[emphasis added].” (p.313) 
212  In the context of discussing the Domain Name System (DNS), Mueller (2017) maintains that “if an                                 
alternative DNS root was adopted by a significant portion of the world’s Internet users and could stay in                                   
existence for a long period of time, it would meet all the criteria for technical fragmentation ... But how likely                                       
is this to happen?" (pp.58­59) He considers “defection from the ICANN root for political reasons”,                             
conceding that it “is conceivable that a national government with a large population,  or a coalition of them ,                                   
could establish an alternate DNS root and coerce their national ISPs to point at it. But even in these cases,                                       
network effects would trump the desire to split [emphasis added].” (pp.59­60) In short, any such attempt at                                 
fragmentation is doomed to failure on account of network effects: “the network effects and economic                             
benefits of global compatibility are so powerful that  they have consistently defeated, and will continue to                               
defeat , any systemic deterioration of the global technical compatibility that the public Internet created. The                             
rhetoric of ‘fragmentation’ is in some ways a product of confusion, and in other ways an attempt to                                   
camouflage another, more inflammatory issue: the attempt by governments to align the Internet with their                             
jurisdictional boundaries. The fragmentation debate is really a power struggle over the future of national                             
sovereignty in the digital world. It’s not just about the Internet. It’s about geopolitics, national power, and                                 
the future of global governance [emphasis added].” (p.3) Once again, the issue is framed in state­centric                               
terms, viz. as a power struggle between national governments and proponents of transnational network                           
liberalism. Yet to what extent might this be a rhetorical strategy designed to maintain the status quo in the                                     
face of de­Westernizing, if not decolonizing, contestation by non­Western national governments? Is it not                           
possible that Mueller is, albeit unintentionally, leveraging the argument for network effects for  political                           
purposes? According to Barabási and Bonanbeau (2003), network effects are  not fully determinative of                           
structural outcomes. Is it possible that Mueller is here  overplaying the power of network effects, viz.                               
engaging power laws along Foucauldian ‘disciplinary’ lines with the (possibly unintended) consequence of                         
forestalling resistance to the modern/colonial order including alleged emerging ‘post­Westphalian’                   
transnational liberal network nation formations? According to Mueller (2017), “the inertial power created by                           
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moves within a terrain governed by the operation of neoliberal logics  . While these do                           213
not constitute  de-colonial moves  per se , I would suggest that transitioning to a decolonial                           
orientation is not precluded; rather, the possibility of  facilitating a decolonial shift                       
presents itself, viz. de-Westernization as decolonial precursor condition  . 214
In closing, and somewhat ironically borrowing from Mueller’s (2010) articulation about                     
‘cyberliberty’ discussed earlier yet repurposing it in pursuit of a decolonial project  , I                         215
should like to argue that there can be no  cyberjustice without a decolonial movement to                             
advance and secure redistribution of wealth and power – and personhood (that is,                         
personal worth) – more generally on a global scale, thereby effecting the necessary                         
compensation and reparations in respect of the legacy system effects of five centuries of                           
European colonialism  . In short, I insist that it is imperative to embrace the ‘decolonial                           216
two decades of convergence on the ICANN root is enormous.” (p.60) Granted, yet is it  insurmountable ?                               
Would this not be to naturalize and thereby depoliticize the ontology of the Internet, rendering it something                                 
beyond / outside of history? Is this not tantamount to endorsing socio­technical determinism? I would                             
suggest that Mueller’s entire argument against fragmentation – or rather alignment – turns on a defence of                                 
globalized liberal ‘free­market’ information capitalism as  a fait accompli . Yet as argued previously, in the                             
modern/colonial world system, this also amounts to an argument for digital  colonialism . 
213  In a study aimed at attempting to articulate Internet governance ‘from a Global South perspective’,                               
Zapata Rioja (2014) concludes by proposing a “heterarchic broad Multistakeholder transnational model for                         
Internet governance, with bodies that act like imagined centers [which] could be one of the fundamental                               
innovations the Global South can bring about to the Global Internet governance of the 21 st Century.” (p.89)                                 
While well­intentioned, it is unclear  how the shift from a hegemonically – and thereby  hierarchical –                               
core­centric / West­centric multistakeholderism to a  heterarchical distribution of power is to be effected. 
214  Of course, the possibility of indefinite  deferral of the decolonial project by such non­Western,                             
non­West­centric statist entities also presents itself. 
215  Mueller (2010) maintains that “calling for sustainability, the elimination of poverty, and social justice is                               
one thing; it is quite another to have an ideology that provides a political movement with pragmatic                                 
guidance on how to deliver those things to a global polity.” (p.260) Going further he argues that he                                   
considers the possibility of social democrats being “even more radical and mobiliz[ing] for the creation of a                                 
completely new, transnational sector specific redistributive  state for communication­information technology                   
[emphasis added]” (p.261), yet against this asks “what kind of a global polity would effectively combine the                                 
populations of North and South America, Europe, Africa, Russia, India, and China into a cohesive public?”                               
(p.261) I would suggest that critical race theory and decolonial thought indeed provides the requisite                             
ideology to effect social justice and that decolonial computing, with its embrace of the ‘decolonial turn’ and                                 
preferential option for the peripheralised, provides the required  orientation for thinking about how to effect                             
compensatory / reparative action in a global Internet governance context (Mueller’s reference to “global                           
polity” is problematic insofar as it does not focus on the differential positioning of body­politically marked                               
and geo­politically situated actors within the global racialized political sphere, viz. core and periphery.)                           
Mueller (2010) maintains that “contemporary social democrats involved in Internet governance ... continue                         
to articulate high­sounding norms and political goals and do not worry much about how to deliver them.”                                 
(p.262) Granted that the matter of identifying appropriate  institutional  means by which to effect                           
compensatory social justice remains outstanding, does Mueller really mean to suggest that such goals                           
should not continue to be articulated  a fortiori ? 
216  In this connection, Zapata Rioja (2014) argues that “the crisis of the liberal and representative                               
democracy in our times, visible in the deficits of credibility and legitimacy, has given space for diverse                                 
democratic experiments and initiatives where the tensions between democracy and capitalism, and                       
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turn’ and preferential option for the racialized periphery  . In this connection, Mills                       217
(2015b) has argued that “achieving a new world will require an admission of the white                             
lies that have been central to the making of our current unjust and unhappy planet.                             
Global justice demands, as a necessary prerequisite, the ending of global white                       
ignorance” (p.225), and what he has referred to elsewhere as the ‘unwriting and                         
unwhitening of the world’ (Mills 2015a). In the context of the present study, I conclude by                               
asserting that this needs to extend to mainstream white ignorance concerning the                       
discourse on Internet governance. 
The decolonial writing is on the wall. 
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